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HIS Article discusses the significant insurance cases applyingTTexas law during this Survey period.
I. BAD FAITH
A. ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy,' Gandy sued her stepfa-
ther, Pearce, for sexually abusing her over several years when she was a
child. Gandy also sued her mother for allowing the abuse to take place.
State Farm insured Gandy's mother under a homeowner's policy in effect
during part of the time period when the abuse took place. Pearce re-
tained Andrews, the attorney who was representing him in a divorce ac-
tion filed by Gandy's mother and in the criminal case arising out of his
alleged abuse of Gandy, to represent him in Gandy's civil action.
Gandy's mother's divorce attorney actually notified State Farm of
Gandy's lawsuit against Pearce.
State Farm agreed to defend both Pearce and Gandy's mother under a
reservation of rights, but allowed each to select independent counsel at
State Farm's expense. Andrews, however, never submitted any bills to
State Farm or requested any payment of his fees. Apparently, Andrews
did not charge Pearce for representing him in Gandy's civil suit, but only
charged him for the divorce and criminal proceedings. Pearce subse-
quently fired Andrews and retained attorney Pattison to represent him in
Gandy's civil suit. Although aware of State Farm's letter agreeing to pay
Andrews' fees, neither Pattison nor Pearce contacted State Farm.
Following hearings on two motions for sanctions filed against Pearce
for failing to properly respond to discovery, Gandy's attorney extended a
settlement offer to attorney Pattison to settle with Pearce. Under the
proposal, Pearce assigned Gandy all of his claims against State Farm and
1. 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
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agreed to a judgment. Gandy covenanted not to collect the judgment
from Pearce's personal assets. Following settlement discussions, an
agreed judgment, including actual and punitive damages, was entered
against Pearce. One week before the judgment was entered, a State Farm
adjuster contacted Andrews to inquire about the status of the case, only
to learn that Andrews had withdrawn and that Pattison was now repre-
senting Pearce. When the adjuster called Pattison, the attorney re-
sponded that he had not yet had time to review the file and would call
him back. In fact, the paperwork on the settlement had already been
executed. State Farm first learned of the judgment almost a month after
it was entered. State Farm immediately contacted Pattison and asked him
to attempt to have the judgment set aside, offering to continue to defend
Pearce under reservation of rights if the judgment were set aside. Patti-
son refused, and Gandy subsequently sued State Farm and Andrews.
The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm, holding that
it had neither a duty to defend nor indemnify Pearce in Gandy's lawsuit.
However, the trial court ruled that even though State Farm had no duty
to defend Pearce, because it had voluntarily assumed his defense, it was
under a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. Reasoning that An-
drews was State Farm's agent in connection with Pearce's defense, and
relying on evidence that Andrews' negligent representation of Pearce
caused the entry of an excessive judgment against him, the trial court
entered a judgment against State Farm for actual damages and attorneys'
fees. Simply put, if State Farm had properly defended Pearce, the result-
ing judgment would have been substantially less than the judgment
agreed to by the parties. The court of appeals affirmed, 2 agreeing that
although State Farm was not legally obligated to defend Pearce, it was
obliged to use ordinary care in the undertaking once it assumed the de-
fense. 3 The court of appeals noted that there was some evidence that the
judgment harmed Pearce's reputation, credit, and ability to conduct his
business.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, noting that
the settlement between Gandy and Pearce suffered from the same flaws
that in the past led the court to invalidate assignments of causes of action
in other contexts.4 Specifically, the court held that Pearce's assignment to
Gandy violated public policy and, therefore, conveyed nothing to her.5
Because Gandy had no rights against State Farm except as Pearce's as-
signee, the court ruled that she could not recover anything from State
Farm.6 In support of its holding, the court reasoned that (1) the settle-
ment did not end the litigation, but rather prolonged it; (2) Pearce's set-
tlement with Gandy greatly distorted the litigation, forcing Gandy to take
vastly different positions with respect to her damages in order to maxi-
2. 880 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994), rev'd, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
3. Id. at 136.
4. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d at 705.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 711-12.
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mize her position to obtain a judgment against a solvent defendant; and(3) Pearce's settlement with Gandy forced Pearce to take differing posi-
tions with respect to whether or not he ever sexually abused Gandy.7
Based on public policy considerations, the court held that an insured's
assignment of claims against his insurer is invalid if (1) the assignment is
made prior to an adjudication of the plaintiff's claims against the defend-
ant in a fully adversarial trial; (2) the defendant's insurer has tendered a
defense; and (3) the defendant's insurer has either (a) accepted coverage,
or (b) made a good faith effort to adjudicate the coverage issues prior to
the adjudication of the plaintiff's claim.8 However, the court expressly
declined to address whether an assignment is also invalid if one or more
of these elements is lacking.9 In any event, the court stated that a judg-
ment for plaintiff against an insured, rendered without a fully adversarial
trial, is not binding on the carrier or admissible as evidence of damages in
an action against the carrier by plaintiff as the insured's assignee. 10 The
court declared that its holding applied to any pending case in which com-
plaint of the assignment was preserved and to all assignments executed
after the date of the decision."
Without question, the Gandy decision alters the manner in which
"sweetheart deals" were formerly transacted in the state of Texas. Both
carriers and their insureds should be more inclined to file declaratory
judgment actions to determine the duty to defend and the duty to indem-
nify. Courts and carriers, however, should be vigilant of assignments re-
sulting from trials which purport to be "adversarial proceedings.' 12
B. REPRESENTATION OF COVERAGE TO INSURED
In St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Dal-Worth Tank Co.,13 Dal-
Worth Tank manufactured and sold tanker trucks for transportation of
liquid propane gas. After Mission Butane, one of Dal-Worth's customers,
suffered three rollovers of Dal-Worth tankers, Mission's insurer notified
Dal-Worth of its intent to pursue a subrogation claim against Dal-Worth
and requested that Dal-Worth notify its carrier of a possible design defect
claim. Dal-Worth forwarded the notice and a subsequent DTPA demand
to St. Paul, its products liability carrier. From there, everything went
awry. After Dal-Worth was served with the suit papers, they were for-
warded to Dal-Worth's insurance agent but apparently were never re-
ceived by St. Paul. The St. Paul adjuster assigned to the file repeatedly
7. Id. at 711-13.
8. Id. at 714.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 720.
12. See American Eagle Ins. Co. v. Nettleton, 932 S.W.2d 169,171 & n.3 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1996, writ denied) (after executing assignment and covenant not to execute with
plaintiff, defendant insureds called no witnesses and offered no evidence in support of their
defense at "trial").
13. 917 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, no writ).
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failed to follow up on indications that Mission's carrier had filed suit
against Dal-Worth. Almost seven months after Dal-Worth was served,
Mission took a default judgment against Dal-Worth for nearly $800,000
plus attorneys fees. Notice of the default judgment was sent to Dal-
Worth, but went unheeded. Later, purely by accident, Mission's subroga-
tion suit was discovered by an attorney sent by St. Paul's adjuster to the
courthouse on another matter concerning Dal-Worth. Although the St.
Paul adjuster discussed having the default judgment set aside, no action
was taken. Instead, St. Paul sent the file to coverage counsel to deter-
mine if the claims in the default judgment were covered by the St. Paul
policies. Although the St. Paul adjuster later told Dal-Worth of the de-
fault judgment, she failed to inform him that St. Paul now questioned
coverage in the matter and that St. Paul had not hired any attorney to
defend Dal-Worth's interests in the default judgment. Even after receiv-
ing counsel's coverage opinion, St. Paul waited a week before denying
coverage to Dal-Worth. Although St. Paul later provided a "courtesy"
defense to Dal-Worth in a related personal injury case, St. Paul refused to
post a supersedeas bond to prevent execution on the writ from the de-
fault judgment on Dal-Worth's property. As a result, Dal-Worth was
forced to file for bankruptcy and later ceased operations completely.
Among other findings at trial, the jury found that St. Paul breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing to Dal-Worth. In holding that suffi-
cient evidence supported the jury's finding, the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals cited St. Paul's denial of coverage four months after the default
judgment was taken and its agents' conduct which led Dal-Worth to be-
lieve that its interests were being represented in the interim. 14 The court
also flatly rejected St. Paul's advice-of-counsel defense to the charge that
it wrongfully denied Dal-Worth's defense. 15 St. Paul's claim that the
claims made in the default judgment were the basis for its denial of cover-
age was also handily rejected by the court, which noted that the identical
claims were made in a DTPA demand letter sent to Dal-Worth and re-
ceived by St. Paul months before suit was filed by Mission. The evidence,
the court held, "was sufficient for the jury to believe that St. Paul lulled
Dal-Worth into believing it was handling the matter, and to find that its
later denial of coverage was a breach of its duty of good faith and fair
dealing."'1 6 In light of the Gandy decision, however, decisions such as this
one will likely be rare in the future.
14. Id. at 55-56.
15. Id. at 56 (citing Nueces Trust Co. v. White, 564 S.W.2d 798, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) as authority that advice of counsel alone does not establish
good faith, but rather it is only to be considered a circumstance tending to show good
faith).
16. Id. at 56 (citing HOW Ins. Co. v. Patriot Fin. Servs. of Tex., Inc., 786 S.W.2d 533,
541 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied), rev'd on other grounds, Hines v. Hash, 843




In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that an insurer
does not owe its insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing to investi-
gate and defend claims by third parties against its insured. In Maryland
Insurance Co. v. Head Industrial Coatings & Services, Inc.,17 Head Indus-
trial contracted to do work for Texas Utilities (TU), agreeing to indem-
nify TU for any injury claims arising out of the work and to purchase
contractual liability insurance for its indemnification obligation. Through
its agent, Gans and Smith, Head purchased a general liability policy from
Maryland. Head specifically instructed the agent to include contractual
liability coverage, but the agent apparently committed a clerical error and
the policy issued did not include the proper endorsement to create such
coverage.
Nelson, a Head employee, sued Head and TU for injuries he sustained
while working on TU's premises. After TU demanded indemnification
from Head, Maryland determined that TU's claim for indemnity was not
covered under the policy. Upon receiving a reservation of rights letter
from Maryland, Head contacted its agent, who assured Head that the TU
claim was covered. However, the agent later discovered his error in fail-
ing to secure the appropriate coverage, and unsuccessfully attempted to
contact Maryland. Later, Maryland denied coverage to Head for TU's
indemnification claim.
In the underlying trial, Nelson recovered a judgment against TU, and
TU recovered a judgment on its indemnity cross-claim against Head. A
suit for wrongful denial of its claim by Head against Maryland and its
agent was in progress at the time the underlying judgments were ren-
dered. Subsequently, Head settled with Nelson and TU, who assigned to
Head their causes of action against Maryland and agreed not to execute
on the underlying judgments. Head's insurance agent also guaranteed
settlement funds to Head in exchange for Head's hold harmless agree-
ment. Head dropped the agent from the case, but Maryland brought the
agent back into the suit as a third-party defendant. At trial, in light of the
agent's testimony about his clerical error, Maryland admitted that Head's
claim was covered, and offered to pay the policy benefits. The jury deter-
mined that Maryland violated the Insurance Code by engaging in unfair
or deceptive acts, but had not acted knowingly. The jury also found that
the agent neither breached any fiduciary duty owed to Maryland nor
breached its agency contract with Maryland.
At the case's initial stop on appeal, 18 the Texarkana Court of Appeals
held that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a liabil-
ity insurance policy can constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice
subjecting the carrier to liability under article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
17. 938 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996).
18. Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 906 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1995), rev'd, 938 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996).
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ance Code. 19 The court held that there was sufficient evidence that
Maryland breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing based upon the
acts of its agent. Noting that a carrier is liable to the insured for acts of
agents which breach a duty of good faith and fair dealing,20 the court of
appeals held that the agent's failure to acknowledge his clerical error was
"tantamount to misrepresentation, because he was aware that coverage
was being denied because of his failure to correct his error."''E The
agent's acts were attributable to Maryland and as such, were sufficient
evidence that Maryland breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to
Head. The court of appeals also found that a knowing misrepresentation
by an agent meets the requirements for knowing misrepresentation in the
DTPA and Insurance Code. 22 Because the agent was Maryland's local
recording agent,23 Maryland was charged with a knowing violation of the
Insurance Code based on the agent's failure to disclose the policy error.
Under the court's analysis, the knowledge of the agent is the knowledge
of the company itself, and the agent's knowledge is imputed to the
principal.
When the case reached the Texas Supreme Court, the court flatly re-
jected a bad faith cause of action in third-party insurance cases. The
court expressly held that there is only one tort duty in the third-party
context: the Stowers24 duty to settle within policy limits.2 5 The court held
that Stowers, along with the insured's contractual rights, provides full pro-
tection against a carrier's refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-
party claim.26 The court's decision clearly limits an insured's common
law claims for failure to settle a claim being defended by a carrier under a
liability policy to a negligence standard.
D. INSURED AS THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT
In Rumley v. Allstate Indemnity Co.,27 Mrs. Rumley made a claim
under her Allstate policy after she was injured in a one-vehicle accident
while her husband was driving. Although Allstate paid personal injury
19. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996).
20. Maryland Ins. Co., 906 S.W.2d at 227 (citing Natividad v. Alexis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d
695 (Tex. 1994)).
21. Id. at 227.
22. Id. (citing Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ); Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994)).
23. A local recording agent is vested with authority coextensive with the insurer for
writing insurance policies. Head, 906 S.W.2d at 229 (citing Blakely v. American Employ-
ers' Ins. Co., 424 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970); American Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 640
S.W.2d 346 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). "A local recording agent has
the authority to speak and act for the company and to transact all insurance business which
that company is authorized to transact under its permit from the state." Id. (citing Home
Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 129 Tex. 178, 100 S.W.2d 91 (1937)).
24. See Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved).
25. Head, 938 S.W.2d at 28 (citing Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312,
317 (Tex. 1994)).
26. Id. at 28-29.
27. 924 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, no writ).
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protection benefits to Mrs. Rumley, the carrier denied her claim under
the liability portion of the policy because of the family member exclu-
sion.28 Mrs. Rumley later sued Allstate and its adjuster for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, Texas Insurance Code29 violations,
and DTPA 30 violations. The trial court granted Allstate's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Mrs. Rumley's claim was a
third party claim for which the defendants owed no duty of good faith
and fair dealing, (2) there was a reasonable basis for denying the claim
since the validity of the family member exclusion was unsettled at the
time of Allstate's adjustment of the claim, and (3) there was no special
relationship or contractual privity between Allstate's adjuster and Mrs.
Rumley. The Beaumont Court of Appeals acknowledged that the heart
of the issue was whether a duty of good faith and fair dealing could arise
where the claimant is a named insured on the policy on which the liability
claim is made against another named insured. Even though Mrs. Rumley
had a contractual relationship with Allstate, the court noted that the duty
to act in good faith does not arise in every situation where there is a
contractual relationship between the claimant and the carrier.31 Despite
the fact that Mrs. Rumley had "relationships" with both her husband and
Allstate when she asserted a liability claim against her husband, the court
held that Mrs. Rumley became a legal antagonist to both her husband
and Allstate. 32 Based on this context, the court rejected Mrs. Rumley's
assertion that she relied upon Allstate's good faith in handling her
claim.33
E. SEVERANCE AND ABATEMENT
The fundamental advantages of severing and abating "bad faith" claims
from a claim for breach of contract-at least from the insurance carrier's
standpoint-are the limitation of discovery to the contract claim and the
avoidance of exposing all of the carrier's files. Avoiding discovery on the
"bad faith" claims may be particularly desirable where resolution of the
contract claim in the carrier's favor may render the "bad faith" claims
moot. As a result, the issue of severance of bad faith claims was widely
28. The family member exclusion to the liability portion of a personal automobile pol-
icy in Texas typically excludes coverage for the insured "or any family member for bodily
injury to [the insured] or any family member." Rumley, 924 S.W.2d at 448. During the
time Allstate handled Mrs. Rumley's claim, the Texas Supreme Court was considering the
validity of the family member exclusion in the case of National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 829 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), affd, 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993). The
court subsequently invalidated the family member exclusion. National County Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993).
29. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 3, 4(2), 16(a) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996).
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 17 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
31. Rumley, 924 S.W.2d at 449 (citing Caserotti v. State Farm Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 561
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).




litigated during the survey period.34
In Liberty National Fire Insurance Co. v. Akin,35 the Texas Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether a trial court abused its discretion
when it denied a carrier's motion to sever and abate bad faith claims from
a breach of contract claim. The lawsuit underlying the original proceed-
ing arose out of claims by Brodrick against her homeowner's insurance
carrier, Liberty, concerning foundation problems in her home resulting
from water damage. After dispatching an adjuster and an engineer to
investigate the damage, Liberty denied the claim. Brodrick subsequently
filed suit against Liberty for breach of contract, violations of the Texas
Insurance Code and the DTPA, and breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Liberty moved to sever and abate Brodrick's bad faith
claims on the grounds that certain evidence pertaining to Liberty's inves-
tigation, while admissible on the bad faith claims, would be inadmissible
on the contract claim. After the trial court denied the motions, Liberty
filed an original proceeding in the court of appeals. When the appellate
court denied relief, Liberty sought mandamus relief from the Texas
Supreme Court.
Noting that severance of claims rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Liberty's motions. Specifically, the supreme court
found that Brodrick's claims were largely interwoven, that most of the
evidence introduced would be admissible on both claims, and that any
prejudicial effect resulting from a trial of the two claims simultaneously
could be reasonably ameliorated by appropriate limiting instructions to
the jury.36
The supreme court did recognize, however, that severance may be nec-
essary in situations where the carrier has made a settlement offer on a
disputed contract claim. Liberty only made an offer on the undisputed
portion of the contract claim. As such, the supreme court concluded that
"[i]n the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim, or
other compelling circumstances, severance is not required. '37 Impor-
tantly, the supreme court only held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to grant the carrier's motions. 38 In other words, even
34. See, e.g., Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 916 S.W.2d 698, 703 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1996, no writ) (holding that contractual claims must be tried separately from ex-
tracontractual claims in order to avoid prejudice, but declining to expand the holding be-
yond actual trial to include all pretrial proceedings and discovery); Texas Farmers Ins. Co.
v. Stem, 927 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ) (directing the trial court to
sever and abate all proceedings on bad faith claims pending resolution of the breach of
contract claim).
35. 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996).
36. Id. at 630.
37. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 865 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, orig. proceeding); Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parks, 856 S.W.2d 776,




in the absence of a settlement offer, a trial court still maintains discretion
to grant a carrier's motion to sever and abate if it so desires.
II. STOWERS DUTY
A. EFFECT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND
The dispute in Ecotech International, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison,39 arose
out of a wrongful death action against Ecotech. Two of Ecotech's insur-
ance carriers, Mt. Hawley and American Capacity, retained the law firm
of Griggs and Harrison to defend the company. Apparently, during the
course of the underlying litigation, Mt. Hawley received offers to settle
for the $500,000 policy limits40 but failed to pass this information to the
insured. After a verdict substantially in excess of the available policy lim-
its was entered, Ecotech sued the carriers and the defense firm for DTPA
violations, article 21.21 violations, breach of contract, breach of express
and implied warranties, negligence, breach of the common law duty of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud and violation of the Stowers doctrine. 41
On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected the initial con-
tentions of the law firm and the carriers that the Stowers doctrine encom-
passed a majority of Ecotech's claims and that a violation of the Stowers
duty cannot co-exist with Insurance Code or DTPA violations. The de-
fendants also creatively argued that the filing of a supersedeas bond in
the underlying case after the entry of judgment actually negated the ele-
ment of damages from Ecotech's Stowers claim since (theoretically) the
supersedeas bond protected Ecotech from any exposure to the excess
judgment. The court declined to adopt this view. First, a period of over
six months elapsed between the entry of judgment in the underlying pro-
ceedings and the filing of the supersedeas bond, leaving Ecotech exposed
to joint and several liability for a judgment in excess of $2.2 million. Ad-
ditionally, the terms of the bond itself only served to extend Ecotech's
exposure to joint and several liability for the entire amount of the judg-
ment with interest. The carriers, on the other hand, were only required to
indemnify Ecotech for the percentage of its liability. While acknowledg-
ing that the attorneys and their law firms were not subject to Stowers
liability, the court of appeals held that summary judgment for the defend-
ants was inappropriate because neither the law firm nor the carriers had
attempted to disprove the other causes of action against them.
39. 928 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
40. Ecotech learned after the entry of judgment that it was only entitled to indemnity
of $200,000 because the $500,000 policy limits were reduced according to the policy terms
by the costs of defense in the underlying litigation. Id. at 648.
41. Under the doctrine outlined in Stowers Furniture Co., v. American Indem. Co., 15
S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n. App. 1929, holding approved), an insured may recover from his
insurance carrier the entire amount of a judgment in excess of policy limits rendered
against him, if prior to judgment, the insurer negligently failed to accept a settlement offer
within the liability limits of the policy. A carrier is "held to that degree of care and dili-
gence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of his own
business." Id. at 547.
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B. DEMAND FOR MULTIPLE LIMITS
In Traver v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,42 Davidson
and Klause were involved in a car accident. Jordan, a passenger in
Klause's car, made claims against Davidson and Klause, who were both
insured by State Farm. Ultimately, State Farm offered to settle Jordan's
claims for the full limit of Davidson's liability coverage and the full limits
of Klause's liability and uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM)
coverages. Jordan's attorney rejected this offer, but continued to demand
the "policy limits from both insureds including uninsured motorist cover-
age."'43 At trial, the jury found Davidson solely responsible for the acci-
dent and awarded Jordan $375,000 in damages. Traver, the executor of
Davidson's estate, sued State Farm for (1) breaching its duty to defend
Davidson in the underlying litigation; (2) its negligence in handling Jor-
dan's case against Davidson; (3) breaching the duty of good faith and fair
dealing; (4) violating the DTPA;" and (5) violating article 21.21.45 State
Farm obtained a summary judgment from the trial court.
After determining that a cause of action for breach of the Stowers duty
survives the death of the insured,46 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed the case under the requirements of American Physicians Insurance
Exchange v. Garcia.4 7 The court noted that clearly State Farm's offer of
Davidson's entire policy liability limits was on the table during the en-
tirety of the Jordan litigation. Under the terms of Davidson's State Farm
policy, Jordan was never entitled to make a claim for Davidson's UM/
UIM coverage; thus Jordan's demand for Davidson's UM/UIM policy
limits was a settlement offer that was neither within the scope of coverage
nor within the policy limits of Davidson's policy. The court held that the
exclusion of the Stowers cause of action affected the viability of other
causes of action, including State Farm's alleged failure to settle, breach of
42. 930 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ granted).
43. Id. at 865.
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 17 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
45. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996).
46. In the absence of a statute, "the test most commonly used to determine
survivability is whether or not the cause of action may be assigned." Traver, 930 S.W.2d at
867 (citing Harding v. State Nat'l Bank, 387 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1965, no writ)). An insured's right to sue for failure to settle is subject to assignment.
Charles v. Tamez, 878 S.W.2d 201, 208 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied);
Garcia v. American Physicians Ins. Exch., 812 S.W.2d 25, 33-34 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994). "Because an insured's cause of
action based upon Stowers can be assigned, it can also survive the death of the insured."
Traver, 930 S.W.2d at 867.
47. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994). To impose a Stowers duty on a carrier when there is a
single claim, a settlement demand must propose to release the insured fully in exchange for
a stated sum of money. Id. at 848-49. The Stowers duty is not activated by a settlement
demand unless three prerequisites are met: (1) the claim against the insured is within the
scope of coverage; (2) there is a demand within policy limits; and (3) the terms of the
demand are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likeli-
hood and degree of the insured's potential exposure to an excess judgment. Id. at 849. A




the duty to defend, and violations of the Insurance Code and DTPA.48
III. GENERAL LIABILITY
A. TRIGGER OF COVERAGE
The Second Circuit applied Texas law to a convoluted coverage case
involving excess liability coverage for asbestos-related personal injury
and property damage claims in Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos
Claims Management Corp.49 National Gypsum Company (NGC) and a
number of its liability insurers sought declaratory relief to clarify the ex-
tent to which NGC was entitled to indemnification for claims arising from
NGC's manufacture of asbestos products. Because the insurance policies
were triggered by injury or damage that occurs during the policy period,
the court centered its focus on when the asbestos-related bodily injury or
property damage occurred.
With respect to bodily injury claims, the Second Circuit held that the
occurrence-based policies could be triggered throughout a gradual dis-
ease process where injury-in-fact can be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence to be occurring at each point in that process.50 The court also
held that NGC was correctly allocated the pro rata share of liability at-
tributable to those periods during which NGC was uninsured, but the
"proration-to-the-insured" approach was modified so as not to apply to
injuries occurring after 1985, when asbestos insurance was unavailable.51
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that NGC did not
expect or intend the bodily injuries caused by its products, rejecting the
carriers' argument that even if NGC did not actually expect or intend the
injuries, no coverage should be afforded if the evidence established that
NGC "should have" expected the harm.52
With respect to the property damage claims, the court found that the
costs of removing and replacing asbestos products from buildings were
properly considered "property damage." 53 NGC could not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that property damage was occurring con-
tinuously or at any given point following installation of NGC's building
48. Traver, 930 S.W.2d at 868 (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 846-47 & nn. 8 & 10
("Breach of the Stowers duty does not constitute a violation of article 21.21 or the
DTPA.")). But see Ecotech Int'l, 928 S.W.2d at 649 (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 847 n.1 1.)
("Contrary to the insurers' contention, in some circumstances there can exist a violation of
article 21.21 and the DTPA in addition to a Stowers violation.").
49. 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995).
50. Id. at 1197. The court cited National Standard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No.
CA-3-81-1015-D, 1984 WL 23448 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 1984) and Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
National Gypsum Co., 682 F.Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tex. 1988) for support in "confidently pre-
dict[ing] that Texas... will permit triggering throughout the period between exposure and
date of claim or death in all cases in which the evidence persuades the trier of fact that
successive injuries are recurring." Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1197.
51. Id. at 1204.
52. Id. at 1205.
53. Id. at 1208-09.
1326 [Vol. 50
INSURANCE LAW
materials.54 The court also rejected NGC's position that all of the asbes-
tos-in-building claims arose out of a single occurrence, i.e., NGC's deci-
sion to manufacture and sell asbestos-containing building materials.55
Instead, the court held that each installation of NGC's products consti-
tuted a separate occurrence, requiring the application of another
deductible.56
B. OCCURRENCE
In a significant affirmation of its previous holding in Columbia Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc. 5 7 the Fifth Circuit determined in New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.58 that an agent's intent
is imputed to its principal for purposes of ascertaining whether an "occur-
rence" is alleged under a commercial general liability policy. In New
York Life, Hernandez alleged that Herrera, a New York Life agent, de-
frauded her in connection with the sale of a life insurance policy. Her-
nandez alleged that Herrera and New York Life (NYL) jointly engaged in
fraudulent and misleading conduct, as NYL negligently failed to follow its
own underwriting guidelines, failed to formulate adequate rules and poli-
cies, and negligently hired and supervised Herrera. Travelers refused to
defend and indemnify NYL in the Hernandez lawsuit. The jury in the
state court suit subsequently returned a verdict against NYL. NYL then
settled with Hernandez for an amount in excess of the aggregate limit of
the Travelers policies.
NYL instituted a lawsuit against Travelers for breach of the insurance
policies. The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment lim-
ited to the issue of whether Travelers breached its duty to defend NYL.
The district court granted summary judgment for Travelers. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit agreed that the case was directly controlled by Fiesta
Mart. In Fiesta Mart, the Fifth Circuit held that, although the complaint
alleged negligent and unknowing acts by the insured, the insured's liabil-
ity was related to and interdependent to the agent's fraud and, therefore,
the carrier had no duty to indemnify the insured for the underlying judg-
ment. The Fifth Circuit rejected NYL's attempts to characterize the "oc-
currence" as exposure to its own negligent and unknowing acts, finding
that NYL's liability was clearly related to and interdependent on Her-
rera's fraud.59 Additionally, NYL argued that Fiesta Mart was not bind-
ing on the Fifth Circuit because it is directly contrary to a later Fifth
Circuit opinion, Western Heritage Insurance v. Magic Years Learning Cen-
ters & Child Care, Inc.60 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the inconsistent
position on this issue taken in Fiesta Mart and Magic Years, but noted that
54. Id. at 1210.
55. Id. at 1213-14.
56. Id. at 1214.
57. 987 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1993).
58. 92 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1996).
59. Id at 339.
60. 45 F.3d 85 (5th Cir. 1995).
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it was bound to follow the earlier opinion in Fiesta Mart.61
The New York Life decision may foreclose certain actions against em-
ployers or principals where plaintiffs allege remote acts of negligence on
the part of the employers or principals in order to trigger coverage for the
intentional acts of their employees or agents. Under simple principles of
agency, an agent's intentional acts appear to be imputed to the principal,
thereby precluding a duty to defend.
C. EXPECTED OR INTENDED INJURY EXCLUSION
In Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co., 62 National Union filed a declaratory judgment action on its duty to
defend its insureds, three Merchants entities, and their driver, Hart,
under two insurance policies issued by National Union. National Union
contended that it had no duty to defend the Merchants entities or Hart in
a wrongful death lawsuit of a van's passenger who was shot by Hart while
Hart was allegedly driving a Merchants truck. The suit alleged Hart was
negligent in handling a firearm and that Merchants was negligent in hir-
ing Hart and in failing to provide proper supervision of its driver.
Merchants sought coverage under a commercial general liability policy
and a truckers liability policy, both issued by National Union.
National Union acknowledged that it had a duty to defend Merchants
in the underlying suit under the CGL. National Union filed a declaratory
action seeking a determination of its remaining duties to defend
Merchants under the truckers policy and to defend Hart under both poli-
cies. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of National
Union. On appeal, National Union contended that it owed no duty to
defend either Hart or Merchants under the truckers policy 63 because the
injuries suffered by Gonzales did not result from the "ownership, mainte-
nance or use" of the vehicle operated by Hart. The underlying petition
alleged that Hart negligently discharged the gun while operating a
Merchants truck. National Union argued that a causal connection must
exist between the use of the automobile and the accident, and that the
discharge of the firearm was not causally connected to the operation of
the truck. The court of appeals, however, reasoned that if Merchants'
driver was authorized to carry a weapon for protection when operating
the truck, and if the driver negligently discharged the weapon while oper-
ating that truck, then any damages resulting from the discharge arguably
61. 92 F.3d at 340 n.4 (citing Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("That portion of Magic Years was an alternative holding and failed to acknowl-
edge, let alone discuss, Fiesta Mart. Although we acknowledge the inconsistency in our
caselaw, we are bound to follow the earlier decision.")). This note by the Fifth Circuit
appears to seriously question the precedential value of Magic Years.
62. 919 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996), rev'd, 939 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. 1997).
63. The insuring agreement of the truckers policy provided: "We will pay all sums an
insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which
this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of a covered auto." Merchants, 919 S.W.2d at 905.
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arise out of the operation of that truck.64 Therefore, the court of appeals
determined that summary judgment for National Union was inappropri-
ate and additional facts were needed to determine whether the negligent
discharge of the firearm was causally connected to the operation of the
truck.65
The supreme court, acknowledging that the underlying petition alleged
"use of a covered auto," dismissed the court of appeals' finding that a
causal connection existed between the use of the auto and Gonzalez's
injuries. 66 The court held that "the mere fact that an automobile is the
situs of the accident is not enough to establish the necessary nexus be-
tween the use and the accident to warrant the conclusion that the acci-
dent resulted from such use."'67 The court found that because the facts
alleged in the pleadings did not suggest even a remote causal connection
between the truck's operation and Gonzalez's injuries, the pleadings did
not create that degree of doubt which compels resolution of the issue for
the insured.68 In light of the holding that the pleadings did not allege that
Gonzalez's injuries resulted from the use of a covered auto, the court
declined to address whether the negligent hiring and supervision claims
against merchants triggered coverage under the truckers policy.69
The decision in Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc.,70
was a long time in the making. Beginning in 1982, Vacuum Tanks was
embroiled in a environmental legal tangle stemming from contaminated
waste sites. Vacuum Tanks sought coverage primarily for legal expenses
under liability policies issued by Bituminous from 1959-1965; however,
Vacuum Tanks also sought a defense from Bituminous for three suits for
property damage. Due to the age of the policies, the parties spent several
years trying to determine the contents of the lost policies.71 The Fifth
Circuit determined that under Texas law, pollution cleanup costs incurred
by a government in responding to the dumping of hazardous wastes on
property, and imposed on an insured under CERCLA,72 are covered
under the standard comprehensive general liability policy language insur-
64. Id. at 906.
65. Id.
66. Merchant, 1997 WL at 71253, *2-3.
67. Id. at *2 (citing 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 194, at 704 (1980)).
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id. National Union also argued before the Eastland Court of Appeals that it had
no duty to defend Hart under the CGL policy because Hart was acting outside the course
and scope of his employment at the time of the shooting. The court of appeals, however,
rejected this argument in favor of the underlying petition's direct allegation that Hart was
Merchants' employee and that Hart "negligently discharged a firearm" while operating a
Merchants truck, holding that National Union had a duty to defend Hart under the terms
of the CGL policy. Merchants, 919 S.W.2d at 907. On appeal to the supreme court, Na-
tional Union dropped its complaints under the CGL policy.
70. 75 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1996).
71. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d at 1130 (5th Cir.
1992).
72. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
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ing clause 73 for amounts the insured is legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of "injury to or destruction of property." The court
specifically declined to classify such cleanup costs as economic injuries.
The court further determined that because the underlying lawsuits did
not allege that the insured intended or expected the injury or damage, the
suits alleged a covered "accident," notwithstanding Bituminous' conten-
tion that Vacuum Tanks' transportation of the hazardous material was
intentional. The distinguishing factor in this case was that migration of
the contaminants was the cause of the damages to property adjacent to
the waste site.74 Accordingly, the court held that Bituminous was obli-
gated to defend Vacuum Tanks in the underlying suits for property
damage.
D. EMPLOYEE BODILY INJURY EXCLUSION
In Assicurazioni Generali v. Pipe Line Valve Specialties Co.,75 the court
held that even though the leasing contract specifically provided that the
employee leasing company remained the employer for all purposes, the
contract is not controlling when it is merely a "sham." The court noted
that Pipeline Valves (the insured on the policy involved) fired all of its
employees, entered into an employee leasing arrangement, and then "re-
hired" via the leasing contract all of its former employees, causing no
disruption to its operations. The leasing company was simply in the busi-
ness of leasing employees and did not in any capacity work in the oil field
pipe valve business. Therefore, when a leased employee sustained an on-
the-job injury while working for Pipeline in the course of its normal busi-
ness operations, Pipeline was not entitled to coverage under its CGL pol-
icy.7 6 By determining that the injured employee was effectively the
"borrowed servant" of the insured, both the insured and the leasing com-
pany were deemed to be co-employers of the injured man.77
E. POLLUTION EXCLUSION
1. Limited Pollution Exclusion
In SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co.,78 SnyderGeneral
operated a manufacturing plant from April 1982 to July 1988 where it
used and stored an industrial degreaser solvent, trichloroethane (TCA).
A plant manager noticed a dramatic loss of TCA from one of the tanks
73. The specimen policy which the trial court adopted covered "all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness
or disease ... sustained by any person and caused by accident." Vacuum Tanks, 75 F.3d at
1052. The policy also covered "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use
thereof, caused by accident." Id.
74. Id. at 1054-55.
75. 935 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
76. Id. at 887.
77. Id. at 886.
78. 907 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
1330 [Vol. 50
INSURANCE LAW
on November 18, 1983. SnyderGeneral employees observed several leaks
on the side of the tank, saw rust surrounding the holes, and concluded
that the leaks were caused by corrosion. It was later discovered that the
groundwater at the facility was contaminated with TCA. SnyderGeneral
regularly pumped groundwater from wells for use during its manufactur-
ing process. Over a number of years, SnyderGeneral incurred environ-
mental cleanup costs that it contended were the result of the 1983 TCA
discharge. SnyderGeneral, which was not sued in connection with the
cleanup of its facility, notified Century of its claim for coverage of the
cleanup expenses.
In the resulting lawsuit, Century moved for summary judgment based
on three provisions of its policy: (1) the limited pollution exclusion; (2)
the "care, custody or control" exclusion; and (3) the term "damages" in
the insuring agreement. 79 In connection with construing an exception to
the pollution exclusion, the court was called upon to decide whether the
TCA discharge for which SnyderGeneral sought coverage was "sudden
and accidental" and whether that phrase also included a temporal compo-
nent. The court concluded that the phrase "sudden and accidental" does
have a temporal component, and rejected the argument that "sudden and
accidental" was synonymous with "unforeseen. '80
Then, in connection with its analysis of the meaning of the temporal
element of "sudden," the court concluded that "sudden" "can mean an
instantaneous or abrupt event, or an unexpected incident of limited
(although longer than instantaneous) duration."'81 The court then deter-
mined what aspect of a discharge must be "sudden." After a detailed
analysis of case law from Texas and other jurisdictions, the court con-
cluded that there are two aspects of a pollution discharge that, if "sud-
den," are not excluded from coverage by the pollution exclusion. The
first aspect
is the period of time that commences with the release of a contami-
nant and terminates with the cessation of the flow. In the case of a
leak, this period represents the time . . . when waste first escapes
from its container and ends when the flow ceases. Under [the court's
view], the duration of the leak determines the suddenness of the
discharge.82
The second aspect is the cause of the discharge. 83 According to the court,
the requirement of an accidental discharge means the policyholder can-
not intentionally discharge pollution. Because intent requires evidence of
an insured's pre-discharge conduct, the court looks to the cause of the
discharge. The court concluded that the phrase "sudden and accidental"
modified the term "discharge" and that if the "accidental" prong natu-
rally refers to the cause of the discharge, the "sudden" prong can be read
79. Id. at 995.
80. Id. at 997.
81. Id. at 1000.




the same way.8 Under this view, the duration or nature of the cause of
the discharge must qualify as "sudden." These interpretations are consis-
tent with carriers' intent to limit pollution coverage to events that satisfy
a temporal requirement. Because SnyderGeneral presented evidence
that the TCA leak occurred within a 24-hour period, the court concluded
that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the TCA leak
was of a limited duration.85 Accordingly, the court refused to grant Cen-
tury's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the pollution
exclusion.
Next, the court analyzed the policy exclusion that precluded coverage
for "'property used by the insured' or 'property in the care, custody or
control of the insured or as to which the insured is for any purpose exer-
cising physical control.' 86 The court concluded that Texas law requires
that the property in question be property that is totally and physically
manipulated by the insured.87 Concluding that SnyderGeneral did not
physically manipulate the entire pool of groundwater beneath the site,
but only controlled the groundwater that it actually pumped out and
used, the court held that SnyderGeneral's use of a portion of the ground-
water did not constitute use or control of all of the groundwater.88 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected Century's contention that the "care, custody
or control" exclusion barred SnyderGeneral's claim.89
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the word "damages"
in the policy's basic insuring agreement included equitable relief such as
environmental cleanup costs. Relying on cases decided under Texas law
that distinguish between legal and equitable relief in other insurance con-
texts, as well as on cases characterizing environmental cleanup costs as
equitable relief, the court concluded that the recovery sought by
SnyderGeneral for the environmental cleanup expenses did not qualify as
"damages" under the policy and granted Century's motion for summary
judgment. 90
Mustang Tractor & Equipment Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,91
involved the construction of the "sudden and accidental" exception to a
pollution exclusion. Mustang settled a lawsuit with Olin by agreeing to
pay $600,000 toward environmental cleanup costs assessed by the Texas
Water Commission. After settling with Olin, Mustang sued its primary
insurer, Liberty Mutual, and its excess carriers, including First State.
Mustang sought to recover under its CGL policies the money it expended
in the Olin settlement and the cost of defending several other lawsuits.
84. Id. at 1002.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1002-03.
87. Id. at 1003 (citing Hartford Cas. Co. v. Cruse, 938 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1991)).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1005.
91. 76 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1996).
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In the underlying lawsuit, Olin alleged that after Mustang assumed
control of the property, it demolished the structures on the property, ex-
tracted the concrete foundations, removed tanks, stripped vegetation, dug
pits and trenches, installed underground tanks and pipes, bulldozed
mounds of dirt, paved some areas, and constructed new buildings. Olin
contended that these activities caused pollution to enter the ground. The
trial court granted the insurers' motion for summary judgment in the cov-
erage lawsuit and Mustang appealed.
Mustang argued on appeal that the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the pollution exclusion was ambiguous and that the word "sudden"
could mean either "unexpected" or "something that occurs quickly, rap-
idly or abruptly." According to Mustang, extrinsic evidence was admissi-
ble to resolve the ambiguity. Conversely, the carriers argued that
"sudden" is commonly understood to mean quickly or rapidly, that the
word is not ambiguous, and that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible.
Relying in part on the dictionary definition of "sudden," 92 the Fifth
Circuit construed the pollution exclusion to bar coverage for releases of
pollutants that are not quick or rapid as well as accidental.93 Noting that
Texas courts generally agree that "accidental" describes an unforeseen or
unexpected event, 94 the court concluded that giving "sudden" the same
meaning as "accidental" would violate the requirement that each word in
a policy provision be given effect.95 Thus, under Texas rules of construc-
tion, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that "sudden" must be read to include a
temporal element. Because there was only one reasonable interpretation
of the word as it was used in the policy provision, the word was not am-
biguous and Mustang was not entitled to offer extrinsic evidence to sup-
port its definition of the word "sudden. '96
In SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co.,97 a manufac-
turing plant owned and operated by a predecessor of SnyderGeneral used
trichloroethylene to clean coils it produced, as well as to wash the floor
and other activities. Any TCE spilled was collected by a drain system in
the plant and emptied into dry wells located on the plant property. After
several years, the groundwater was discovered to be contaminated and a
government-ordered clean-up ensued. SnyderGeneral sought indemnifi-
cation from its liability carriers for the $7 million in costs, settlements and
legal fees which it incurred as a result of the contamination. The carriers
denied coverage based on the limited pollution exclusion found in the
92. Id. at 91-92 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2284 (1981) (list-
ing as two of its alternative definitions "happening without previous notice or with very
brief notice: coming or occurring unexpectedly: not foreseen or prepared for" and "charac-
terized by swift action")).
93. Id. at 93.








Subsequent to determining that Texas law applied to the contract, the
court addressed the issue of whether the facts of the case fell within the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the limited pollution exclusion.
Applying the general rules of contract construction, the court concluded
that the limited pollution exclusion bars coverage for discharges that are
not abrupt as well as unexpected or unintentional.99
2. Absolute Pollution Exclusion
In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Kenworthy Oil Co.,1°° Kenworthy Oil
was named as a defendant in litigation which alleged that the defendants
conducted oil and gas recovery operations in a manner which resulted in
the corruption of the underlying aquifer by residual pollutants. The un-
derlying lawsuit pled causes of action for negligence, trespass, nuisance,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, strict liability, fraud, and
breach of covenants within oil and gas leases or easements. Kenworthy
sought defense and indemnity from Bituminous, which was Kenworthy's
CGL carrier from 1990 to 1995. Bituminous filed a declaratory judgment
action and sought a summary judgment.
In its decision, the court adopted the "same nucleus of facts" test enun-
ciated in Northbrook Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Water District Manage-
ment Co.10 The court noted that when the "factual allegations are
distilled to their essence, it is clear that plaintiff seeks recovery of dam-
ages for past and future pollution of the underlying aquifer. ' 10 2 Based on
the repetitious language in the underlying petition which only suggested
pollution as the cause of the plaintiff's damages, the court held that the
98. The limited pollution exclusion stated:
This policy shall not apply.., to liability arising out of the discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape is sudden and accidental.
Id. at 676-77.
99. Id. at 680 (citing in support SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 907 F.
Supp. 991 (N.D. Tex. 1995); American States Ins. Co. v. Hanson Indus., 873 F. Supp. 17(S.D. Tex. 1995); Meridian Oil Prod., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. G-91-
167 (S.D. Tex., Mar. 4, 1993), affid, 27 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Texas Eastern Trans-
mission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 870 F. Supp. 1293, 1349 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (applying Texas law), affd on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 291, 130 L.Ed.2d 206 (1994); National Standard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No.
CA-3-81-1015-D (N.D. Tex., Oct. 4, 1983)).
100. 912 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 105 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1996).
101. Id. at 241 (citing Northbrook, 892 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1995));
[T]he fact that the underlying petitions allege various theories of liability,
including negligence, does not change the nature of the precluded event. Be-
cause all of the underlying plaintiffs' alleged injuries arise out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release, or escape of pollutants, the absolute pollution
exclusion operates to bar recovery of all of the ... plaintiffs' claims.
Northbrook, 892 F. Supp. at 175.
102. Kenworthy Oil, 912 F. Supp at 241.
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absolute pollution exclusion applied to the claim.'0 3 The court also found
that the petition failed to state an "occurrence" because the damages to
the plaintiff's property were the natural and probable consequences of oil
and gas production activities. 1°4 Finally, the court rejected Kenworthy's
contention that the allegations of "trespass" fell within the "personal in-
jury" coverage of the policies. 0 5
F. DESIGNATED PREMISES ENDORSEMENT
Cigna Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Kamins,10 6 involved the duties of three
carriers to defend and indemnify their insured in connection with an un-
derlying automobile accident. Ray died as a result of injuries he received
when his vehicle collided with a taxicab driven by Palmer. Ray's benefi-
ciaries sued Kamins and others to recover damages resulting from Ray's
death. The underlying plaintiffs maintained that Yellow Cab owned and
operated the cab driven by Palmer. The underlying petition contained
allegations of negligent acts and omissions attributable to Kamins, indi-
vidually and d/b/a Yellow Cab, including allegations of negligent failure
to investigate Palmer's background and negligent hiring. Kamins re-
quested that various insurers defend him. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of all of the insurers except Cigna Lloyds,
Kamins' CGL carrier.
The Cigna Lloyds policy contained a designated premises endorse-
ment.'0 7 The schedule to the designated premises described various busi-
ness locations. Upon examining the petition in the underlying suit,
however, the court determined that it mentioned neither any covered
premises nor Kamins' relationship to them. Further, the petition failed to
allege a relationship between any of the premises and the accident. Thus,
the court concluded that no coverage was provided by the commercial
general liability policy and rendered judgment in favor of Cigna
Lloyds.108
The court also addressed whether another Cigna company had a duty
to defend Kamins under its excess policy. The court determined that
there was no underlying or primary insurance policy issued to Kamins
that covered the Ray accident or that triggered the protection of the ex-
103. Id. Courts appear to interpret the absolute pollution exclusion rather meticulously
to the facts of a case. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Bermea, No. V-95-097 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 1995) (absolute pollution exclusion excluded coverage for claimant's alleged
injuries sustained from drinking chemical-tainted water at insured's chemical storage
plant).
104. Id. (citing Meridian Oil Prod., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 27 F.3d
150, 152 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[C]overage does not exist for inevitable results which predictably
and necessarily emanate from deliberate actions.")).
105. Id. at 241-42.
106. 924 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).
107. A designated premises endorsement typically restricts the coverage of the insuring
agreement to damages arising out of "[tlhe ownership, maintenance or use of the premises





cess policy. Noting that there were no obligations imposed upon the pri-
mary carriers listed in the schedule of underlying coverage in the excess
policy, the court concluded that no obligations under the excess policy
were triggered. 109
G. LIQUOR LIABILITY EXCLUSION
In Paradigm Insurance Co. v. Texas Richmond Corp. d/bla The Men's
Club of Houston,110 Paradigm sought a declaration that it had no duty to
defend The Men's Club in an action by Butler, in which she alleged that
she was a passenger in an automobile which was struck by a car driven by
Moraczewski, a patron of the club. Butler alleged that The Men's Club
allowed Moraczewski to leave the club intoxicated, thereby rendering it
liable for the injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. Butler
alleged that the club and its agents were negligent and grossly negligent
in several respects, including failing to hire a competent valet parking
service and failing to supervise the operations adequately.
Paradigm moved for summary judgment on the ground that Butler's
damages were excluded from coverage by the liquor liability exclusion.'11
The club filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the ground that
Paradigm had a duty to defend. The trial court found that Paradigm had
a duty to defend and granted the club's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that Paradigm had no duty to
defend the club because Butler's lawsuit asserted only causes of action
that fell within the liquor liability exclusion. Rejecting the Men's Club's
attempt to distinguish other Texas authority construing the exclusion, the
court of appeals held that Butler's allegation that The Men's Club failed
to hire and select a competent valet parking service was not dependent
upon its causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person. 112 The
court further held that even though the service provided by the valet
company was entirely independent of the club's business of selling and
serving alcohol, Butler's claims of negligent hiring and supervision "actu-
ally stems from the failure of the parking attendant to monitor the intoxi-
cation of patrons who had consumed alcohol at the club."'1 13
109. Id. at 210.
110. No. 14-95-00747-CV, 1997 WL 33944 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 30,
1997, no writ).
111. The policy excluded coverage for:
c. "Bodily injury" or "property damage" for which any insured may be held
liable by reason of:
(1) Causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person;
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal drink-
ing age or under the influence of alcohol; or
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the sale, gift, distribution
or use of alcoholic beverages.
Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *4-5.
113. Id. at *6.
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Accordingly, the court reversed the summary judgment for the club was
appropriate and rendered judgment in favor of Paradigm.
H. EXCESS/UMBRELLA COVERAGE
In St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Lexington Insurance Co.,114 four
insurance carriers contributed to the settlement of a severe personal in-
jury case, each reserving its right to seek a judicial determination of its
contribution obligation to the settlement. In the underlying case, an em-
ployee of a subsidiary of Sanifill was injured in the course and scope of
his employment. Sanifill was covered by four policies: (1) a $500,00 pri-
mary hull protection/indemnity policy issued by Centennial, (2) a $4.5
million excess policy by St. Paul, Centennial's excess carrier, (3) a $1 mil-
lion primary workers compensation and employer's liability policy with
Landmark, and (4) a $5 million excess policy issued by Lexington,
Landmark's excess carrier. Each of the primary carriers tendered their
respective limits to the employee's $4.8 million settlement, while St. Paul
paid almost $1.8 million and Lexington paid $1.6 million. In the subse-
quent declaratory action, the trial court held that the primary carriers
were obligated to contribute their entire policy limits and that the excess
carriers were obligated to make a pro rata contribution on the remainder
based on the amount of coverage provided by each excess policy.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that there are three types of "other
insurance" clauses: pro rata, excess, and escape. 115 The "other insur-
ance" clause in Centennial's primary policy was an escape clause, 116
which St. Paul's excess policy incorporated. Landmark's primary policy
contained a pro rata "other insurance" clause. 17 Lexington's policy con-
tained an excess "other insurance" clause." 8 The court held that because
the "other insurance" clauses of the two primary policies conflicted, lia-
bility would be prorated between the policies.119 Effectively, however,
the court's decision had no impact on the primary carriers since the set-
tlement exceeded the limits of the primary policies. The court also found
that the conflict between the "other insurance" clauses in the excess poli-
114. 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996).
115. Id. at 206.
116. Centennial's policy contained an "other insurance" escape clause which provided
that "where the Assured is, irrespective of this insurance, covered or protected against any
loss or claim which would otherwise have been paid by the Assurer, under this policy, there
shall be no contribution by the Assurer on the basis of double insurance or otherwise." Id.
St. Paul's excess policy adopted the Centennial escape clause through its form-following
provisions. Id.
117. Landmark's pro rata "other insurance" clause provided that Landmark "will not
pay more than [its] share of damages and costs covered by this insurance and other insur-
ance or self-insurance. Subject to any limits of liability that apply, all shares will be equal
until the loss is paid." Id. at 207.
118. The Lexington excess "other insurance" clause stated, "[i]f other valid and collecti-
ble insurance with any other insurer is available to the Insured covering a loss also covered
hereunder, this insurance shall be excess of, and shall not contribute with such other insur-
ance." Id.
119. Id. at 210 (citing Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969)).
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cies mandated that the excess insurance be prorated as well. 120 Finally,
the court rejected Landmark and Lexington's argument that because
Centennial and St. Paul had not reserved their rights on the "other insur-
ance" escape clause as to the insured Centennial and St. Paul were es-
topped from asserting the "other insurance" escape clause against the
other carriers. 121
The impact of insurer instability was exhibited in Taylor Service Co. v.
Texas Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association.122 Taylor
Service purchased two liability policies from COMCO Insurance Com-
pany, one a primary automobile policy and the other an excess policy.
Taylor Service subsequently became liable for $250,000 as the result of an
automobile accident. At the time Taylor Service sought indemnity on the
COMCO policies, the carrier was insolvent and the Guaranty Association
was handling all claims under the Insurance Code. 123 Because the Insur-
ance Code prohibits the Guaranty Association from paying more than
$100,000 for a claim written by an insolvent insurer,124 it paid Taylor Ser-
vice the $100,000 statutory limit under the primary automobile policy.
The Guaranty Association declined, however, to pay any sum under the
excess policy. Taylor Service brought suit to recover the remaining
$100,000 under the excess policy.
On appeal, the court found that the trial court had correctly denied
Taylor Service's claim. The court cited a provision of the excess policy
requiring the insured to maintain the underlying insurance, and that the
insured's failure to do so will not enlarge the carrier's liability under the
excess policy. The provision specifically noted that if the insured was un-
able to recover from the primary carrier because of its insolvency, then
"the coverage afforded by this policy shall apply in excess of the applica-
ble limit of insurance specified in the schedule of 'underlying insur-
ance.' 125 The court interpreted this provision as meaning that the
insolvency of the underlying insurer did not enlarge coverage under the
excess policy. Coverage under the excess policy, held the court, "did not
'drop down' to encompass [the insured's] loss over and above the
$100,000 actually paid" under the primary policy.126 In other words, the
excess policy was not triggered until the $1,000,000 limit of the underlying
policy had been paid.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 207-08.
122. 918 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
123. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28-C (Vernon Supp. 1996).
124. Id. § 5(8).





A. WATER-RELATED FOUNDATION DAMAGE
In Burditt v. West American Insurance Co. ,127 the Burditts sought cov-
erage for a shift in their home's foundation and structural damage to their
home caused by a leak in an interior pipe behind their bathroom wall.
West American issued a homeowner's policy 128 to the Burditts and paid
for the repair of water damage immediately surrounding the pipe, but
denied coverage for cracking in the foundation, walls and ceiling. The
court found that the house suffered foundation damage, which was an
excluded peril. The Burditts argued, however, that deterioration of the
pipe, also an excluded peril, caused water damage to the foundation, thus
fitting within the exception to the exclusionary clause. Essentially, the
Burditts argued that the policy covered water damage caused by deterio-
ration regardless of the foundation damage exclusion.
The court held that the exclusion was ambiguous because it sets out
causal relationships among different, frequently interrelated types of
damages.129 Under those circumstances, the court held that an insured
"need only demonstrate a reasonable interpretation of the clause favor-
ing coverage" and that the Burditts' arguments strongly supported a rea-
sonable interpretation for coverage of the water damage caused by the
pipe's deterioration. 130 The court held that West American's interpreta-
tion of the exclusion "would make the exception for water damage almost
meaningless because it would not include the excluded perils of rust, wet
rot and mold, regardless of their natural association with water dam-
age.' 3 ' As a result, the court reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of West American and remanded the case for
determination of contested issues of material fact. 132
B. APPRAISAL PROVISION
Wells v. American States Preferred Insurance Co.,133 involved the issue
of whether appraisers, acting under the appraisal provision 34 of a Texas
127. 86 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 1996).
128. The policy covered all risk of physical loss not excluded by Section IIB, which read
in part as follows:
This policy does not insure against ...
Loss by termites or other insects; deterioration; smoke from agricultural
smudging or industrial operations; wet or dry rot; mold; mechanical break-
down; settling, shrinkage, or expansion in foundations, walls, floors or ceil-
ings; this Exclusion, however, shall not apply to loss by fire, smoke, (Except
as specifically excluded above), explosion, landslide, total or partial collapse,
water damage, and glass breakage, caused by perils excluded in this
paragraph.
Id. at 476.
129. Id. at 477.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 477-78.
133. 919 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
134. The appraisal provision in the American States policy read:
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homeowners' policy, are authorized and empowered to determine what
caused or did not cause the loss claimed. The Wells purchased an insur-
ance policy from American States insuring their dwelling against founda-
tion and structural damage due to foundation movement caused by leaks
in the plumbing system. The Wells made a claim on the policy for foun-
dation and structural damage caused by a plumbing leak. American
States denied the claim, demanded an appraisal and then sued to require
an appraisal. The Wells counterclaimed on the policy and other causes of
action. The trial court abated the counterclaim until an appraisal was
done.
Two appraisers and an umpire determined that the resulting damage to
the dwelling due to foundation movement was $22,875. However, one
appraiser and the umpire also determined that the plumbing leak caused
no loss. Based on the latter determination, the trial court entered a take
nothing summary judgment against the Wells. The Wells appealed that
decision on the grounds that the appraisal section of the policy, as a mat-
ter of law, did not authorize the appraisers and umpire to determine that
the plumbing leak did not cause the loss to the Wells property. The court
agreed with the Wells and held that the appraisal section of the home-
owners policy does not authorize and empower appraisers to determine
what caused or did not cause a claimed loss. 135 Relying upon holdings
from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that the majority rule is that
appraisers have no power or authority to determine questions of causa-
tion, coverage or liability. The court reasoned that the majority rule was
consistent with Texas courts' discussion of the effect of an appraisal
award, which estops one party from contesting the issue of damages in a
suit on the insurance contract, leaving only the question of liability for the
court.
7. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the actual cash value,
amount of loss or the cost of repair or replacement, either can make a written
demand for appraisal. Each will then select a competent, independent ap-
praiser and notify the other of the appraiser's identity within 20 days of re-
ceipt of the written demand. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If
they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request
that the choice be made by a judge of a district court of a judicial district
where the loss occurred. The two appraisers will then set the amount of loss,
stating separately the actual cash value and loss to each item. If you or we
request they do so, the appraiser [sic] will also set:
a. the full replacement cost of the dwelling.
b. the full replacement cost of any other building upon which loss is
claimed.
c. the full cost of repair or replacement of loss to such building, without
deduction for depreciation.
If the appraisers fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the, um-
pire. An itemized decision agreed to by any two of these three and filed with
us will set the amount of the loss. Such award shall be binding on you and us.
Each party will pay its own appraiser and bear the other expenses of the
appraisal and umpire equally.
Id. at 681.
135. Id. at 683.
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Returning to the language of the appraisal clause, the court held that
the appraisal clause concerned only a dispute over the amount of money
involved in a claim.136 The court noted that the appraisal clause makes
no provision for a "causation dispute" or a "liability dispute. ' 137 The
court held that the appraisal section of the Texas Homeowners policy es-
tablished an appraisal procedure to determine the dollar amount of the
insured's loss only, and that it does not authorize or empower the ap-
praisal panel created thereunder to determine what caused or did not
cause the loss.' 38 As a result, the court held that the one appraiser and
the umpire exceeded their authority when they determined that the
plumbing leak did not cause the Wells' loss.
C. TOTAL Loss DETERMINATION
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mower,139 the Texas Supreme
Court considered whether there was evidence that a home was so dam-
aged that it qualified as a "total loss" under Texas law. The Mowers'
home burned, leaving the foundation and a portion of the garage. The
Mowers demanded payment for a total loss under their $175,000 State
Farm property policy. After two estimates were made for the reconstruc-
tion of the house, State Farm offered the Mowers $90,000. Both of the
estimates obtained by State Farm expressly stated that the garage and
slab foundation would be used in the reconstruction of the home. The
Mowers rejected State Farm's offer and demanded $104,000, the balance
of the mortgage. 140
The supreme court held that a claim could not constitute a "total loss"
if a remnant of the structure is reasonably adapted for use as a basis upon
which to restore the building to its pre-fire condition. 141 Because there
was uncontroverted evidence that the foundation and the garage could be
used in rebuilding the home, the home was not a total loss, and the maxi-
mum award to which the Mowers were entitled was $90,000.142
D. AUTOMOBILE EXCLUSION
In American Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London,143 Wasson, a
jeweler, was the victim of a substantial diamond theft as he ended his
business day of calling on small jewelry retailers in the Houston area. As
Wasson paid for gasoline for his rented car, thieves broke into the trunk
136. Id. at 685.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 917 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1995).
140. Interestingly, the mortgagee, also an insured under the policy, informed the
Mowers that it would accept State Farm's offer if they did not. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. 934 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Tex. 1996); see also Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 04-95-00135-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Aug. 14, 1996, writ requested), for facts
and a holding that are virtually identical to the American Stone Diamond case.
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of the car and vanished with almost $270,000 worth of jewelry. Lloyds of
London denied Wasson's claim under a property policy covering the in-
ventory based on an automobile exclusion. 144 The automobile exclusion
contained an exception for instances in which the insured, its agent or a
person whose sole duty is to attend the vehicle is actually in or upon the
vehicle. American Stone Diamond, the insured, filed suit against Lloyds
for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, fraud, constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary obligations. Lloyds
moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and the
insured responded, asserting (1) that the "in or upon the vehicle" lan-
guage of the policy should include "normal, essential daily activities such
as buying gasoline for a car;" (2) that the exclusion was ambiguous with
regard to coverage for such activities; and (3) that even if unambiguous,
the exclusion was unconscionable when applied to the facts of this
case.
145
The district court cited a litany of cases from other jurisdictions in re-
jecting the insured's assertions that the exclusion excepted "normal, es-
sential daily activities" or was ambiguous.' 46 The court noted that the use
of the term "actually" in the phrase "actually in or upon" the vehicle
plainly expressed the intent of the exclusion. 147 American Stone Dia-
mond's unconscionability claim was also handily rejected by the court
due to the court's perception that the insured was a sophisticated insur-
144. The automobile exclusion to the policy read:
This Insurance insures against all risks of loss or damage to the above de-
scribed property arising form [sic] any cause whatsoever
EXCEPT:
(I) Loss or damage to property insured hereunder while in or upon any
automobile, motor-cycle or any other vehicles unless, at the time of loss or
damage occurs, there is actually in or upon such vehicle, the Assured, or a
permanent employee of the Assured, or a person whose sole duty it is to
attend the vehicle.
American Stone Diamond, 934 F. Supp at 841.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 843 (citing Williams v. Fallaize Ins. Agency, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 411, 469
S.E.2d 752 (1996) (exclusion applicable where insured was in store 25 feet away from vehi-
cle at time of theft); JPM Associates, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 109 Md. App.
343, 674 A.2d 562 (1996) (exclusion applicable where insured was inside service station
paying for gasoline at time of theft); Wideband Jewelry Corp. v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y., 210
A.D.2d 220, 619 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1994) (exclusion applicable where insured's employee was
six feet from vehicle at time of theft); Jerome I. Silverman, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters,
422 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (exclusion applicable where insured was temporarily away
from vehicle at time of theft); Revesz v. Excess Ins. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 125, 106 Cal. Rptr.
166 (1973) (exclusion applicable where insured was getting directions a few feet from vehi-
cle at time of theft); Royce Furs, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 30 A.D.2d 238, 291 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1968) (exclusion applicable where insured was registering inside hotel for a few minutes
while vehicle was six to ten feet outside hotel at time of theft); American Charm Corp. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 574, 289 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1968) (exclusion appli-
cable where insured was in his home with vehicle locked in adjacent garage at time of
theft); Phil G. Ruvelson, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 235 Minn. 243, 50 N.W.2d
629 (1951) (exclusion applicable where insured was away from vehicle for a few minutes to
use bathroom and drink cup of coffee at time of theft).
147. Id. at 843.
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ance purchaser who was aware that the policy's risk of loss was trans-
ferred back to the insured under certain circumstances. 148
V. AUTOMOBILE
A. CONSENT TO SETTLEMENT EXCLUSION
Simpson v. GEICO General Insurance Co.,149 involved the interpreta-
tion of the "consent to settlement" exclusion and the "right-to-recover-
payment" clause in a Texas personal automobile policy in the context of
an insured who settled with a non-motorist tortfeasor without first ob-
taining the insurer's consent. Simpson was involved in an accident with
an underinsured motorist. In addition to the underinsured motorist,
Simpson sued several companies for negligent manufacture and mainte-
nance of barricades at a construction area near the accident site. GEICO
subsequently denied Simpson's claim for underinsured motorist benefits
after he failed to obtain GEICO's consent to a settlement with the de-
fendant companies. After Simpson sued GEICO for breach of contract,
the carrier moved for summary judgment on the basis that Simpson failed
to comply with the "consent to settlement" exclusion, the "right-to-re-
cover-payment" clause, and the recoupment clause within the Texas In-
surance Code. The trial court granted the summary judgment without
specifically stating the reasons for its decision. On appeal, the insured
argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because
he had complied with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy.
In a case of first impression in Texas, the Houston appellate court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the "consent to settlement" exclusion ap-
plied to settlements with non-motorist tortfeasors. After reviewing an
opinion from the Supreme Court of Kansas,150 the court noted that the
exclusion is limited to settlements that jeopardize the ability of the in-
surer to recover from the tortfeasor causing the insured to provided unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage, the allegedly at-fault motorist.' 5 '
Because settlement with a non-motorist tortfeasor does not impede the
rights of the insurer to recover from the uninsured or underinsured mo-
torist, the court held that the "consent to settlement" exclusion did not
apply to settlement with non-motorist tortfeasors. 152 Similarly, the court
found that the statutory subrogation or recoupment clause, 53 which is
designed for the protection of injured parties against uninsured motorists,
does not address other joint tortfeasors. As such, the court held that the
statutory recoupment clause applies only to the uninsured or underin-
sured motorists, not other non-motorist joint tortfeasors. 54 Finally, the
148. Id. at 844-47.
149. 907 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1995, no writ).
150. Bartee v. R.T.C. Transp., Inc., 781 P.2d 1084 (Kan. 1989).
151. Simpson, 907 S.W.2d at 946 (citing Bartee, 781 P.2d at 1099).
152. Id.
153. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 5.06-1, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
154. Simpson, 907 S.W.2d at 947.
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court rejected GEICO's contention Simpson violated the "right-to-re-
cover payment" clause because the provision applies only if the carrier
makes a payment under the policy. Because GEICO had made no pay-
ments under the policy, the court held that the clause was inapplicable. 155
B. PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION
In Schulz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,1 56 Fulk,
Schulz's son, and a friend were driving Schulz's husband's truck when
they gave Johnson a ride. Later, Johnson shot and killed Fulk and his
friend as they stood outside the truck. Schulz sued State Farm to recover
personal injury protection (PIP)157 and auto death indemnity (ADI)158
coverage. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
(1) because there was no collision or automobile accident between the
insured truck and any other vehicle as contemplated by the policy, (2)
because Fulk was not "occupying" the insured vehicle when he was
killed, and (3) because there was no causal relationship between the in-
sured vehicle and the incident giving rise to the injuries, Schulz was not
entitled to any benefits under the policy. 159 Schulz argued that her son
was "occupying" the vehicle at the time he was killed because: (1) "his
status as an 'occupant' continued even though he was shot outside the
vehicle;" (2) "he was in relatively close proximity to the vehicle for pur-
poses related to the vehicle;" and (3) "his exit from the vehicle was not
voluntary, but rather a result of force.' 160 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of State Farm.
The Houston Court of Appeals acknowledged that while the policy's
PIP provision limited recovery to covered persons whose injuries resulted
from a "motor vehicle accident," the pertinent Insurance Code provision
did not include "motor vehicle accident" as a limiting term in the Code's
155. Id. at 949.
156. 930 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
157. The policy's PIP provisions read:
[Wle will pay Personal Injury Protection benefits because of bodily injury
resulting from a motor vehicle accident, and sustained by a "covered
person."
"Covered person" as used in this part means:
1. You or any family member:
a. while occupying; or
b. when struck by a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public
roads or a trailer of any type.
"Occupying" means in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.
Id. at 875.
158. The relevant provision of the ADI coverage portion of the policy stated:
We will pay the principal sum stated in the Schedule in the event of the death
of the person which shall result directly and independently of all other causes
from bodily injury caused by accident and sustained by the insured while
occupying, or through being struck by, an auto...
Id. at 875-76 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 874.
160. Id. Schulz contended in her petition that her son was killed when Johnson at-
tempted to hijack the truck. Id. at 873.
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definition of PIP coverage. 161 Noting that this issue recently arose in an-
other case, 162 the court reiterated its position that, based upon legal and
public policy reasons, "the term 'the accident' means the motor vehicle
accident for which the legislature created automobile liability insurance;
it does not include all accidents that happen to occur in a motor vehi-
cle."'1 63 The court also found that Schulz failed to produce competent
summary judgment evidence to support her claim that Fulk was "occupy-
ing" the vehicle at the time he was shot, and denied her claim for ADI
benefits on that ground. 164
C. UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
In Sidelnik v. American States Insurance Co.,165 the Austin Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether the Texas Insurance Code man-
dates that umbrella policies include UM/UIM coverage. Sidelnik was
killed in an automobile accident involving Ayala, an uninsured motorist.
The Sidelniks were covered under an automobile liability insurance pol-
icy which provided UMIUIM coverage and an umbrella policy, issued by
American States, which provided $1 million in coverage. American
States argued that the umbrella policy did not provide any UM/UIM cov-
erage that would inure to the Sidelniks' benefit. On cross-motions for
summary judgment filed in a declaratory action, the trial court ruled in
favor of American States.
On appeal, the Sidelniks argued that the umbrella policy was ambigu-
ous, and that it should be construed to cover the at-fault driver, Ayala, as
an insured party. After reciting Texas' well-established rules of construc-
tion of insurance policies, the court held that the policy was unambiguous
and covered only the named insured or drivers who operate a vehicle
with permission of the named insured; therefore, Ayala did not qualify as
a covered person under the umbrella policy. 166
Alternatively, the Sidelniks argued that the UM/UIM statute167 man-
dated that the umbrella policy in question include UM/UIM coverage.
After reviewing decisions from other jurisdictions, the court held that
umbrella policies serve a different purpose from that served by automo-
161. Id. at 875 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(b) (Vernon 1981) which
provides:
"Personal injury protection" consists of provisions of a motor vehicle liability
policy which provide for payment to the named insured in the motor vehicle
liability policy and members of the insured's household, any authorized oper-
ator or passenger of the named insured's motor vehicle including a guest
occupant, up to an amount of $2,500 for each such person for payment of all
reasonable expenses arising from the accident....
(emphasis added)).
162. See Le v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 936 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
163. Schulz, 930 S.W.2d at 875 (citing Le, 936 S.W.2d at 324).
164. Id. at 876.
165. 914 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
166. Id. at 694.
167. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1996).
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bile policies, and that the mere fact that an umbrella policy provided ex-
cess coverage for liability did not convert it into an "automobile liability
insurance" policy within the meaning of article 5.06-1.168 Accordingly,
the court concluded that the UM/UIM statute does not require umbrella
policies to carry UM/UIM coverage. 169
In White v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 170 the court
analyzed the construction of the term "covered person" within the UM/
UIM coverage portion of a personal automobile policy. White contended
that she and McLaughlin had been common-law husband and wife since
1986. They allegedly separated in 1989, and with the exception of one
week during 1989, ceased cohabitation at that time. In 1993, McLaughlin
was killed in an accident involving a drunk driver. White asserted a claim
under a personal automobile policy she purchased from State Farm.
State Farm denied White's claim on the basis that McLaughlin did not
qualify as a "covered person," defined in the policy to include "family
members" and any person occupying White's automobile.171
White filed suit in state court, and State Farm removed the action to a
federal court. State Farm filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
White's contractual claims contending that McLaughlin did not qualify as
a "covered person" under the terms of White's policy. Specifically, in its
motion for partial summary judgment, State Farm argued that "(1) White
and McLaughlin were not married at the time of McLaughlin's death;
(2) White's claim of common-law marriage is barred by the statute of
limitations for proving informal marriages under [the Texas Family
Code], and (3) White's claim is barred by quasi estoppel.' u 72 Reviewing
the applicable case law on common-law marriages, the court noted that
once a common-law marriage exists, it may only terminate by death, di-
vorce or annulment. 173 Furthermore, the mere passage of time and ceas-
ing of cohabitation will not serve as grounds for termination. 174
Accordingly, the court held that the existence of the common-law mar-
riage between White and McLaughlin was an issue of fact, and that the
motion should be denied on that issue.
The court agreed with State Farm with respect to its claim that the
statute of limitations for proving informal marriages under the Texas
Family Code had expired, but nevertheless found that the provision
within the Texas Family Code containing the applicable statute of limita-
168. Sidelnik, 914 S.W.2d at 694.
169. Id.
170. 907 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
171. Id. at 1015. Further, the term "family member" is defined to include "any person
who is both a resident of the insured's household and is related to the insured by blood,
marriage or adoption. A spouse who is not a resident of the insured's household 'during a
period of separation in contemplation of divorce' is also covered as a 'family member"'
under the policy.





tions 175 was "unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection
clause of the United States Constitution. 1 76 Therefore, the court denied
State Farm's motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the
statute of limitations provision had expired.
Finally, State Farm argued that White was barred from asserting that
she was common-law married to McLaughlin by operation of the doctrine
of quasi estoppel.177 Specifically, State Farm contended that White repre-
sented to the agent at the time she purchased the policy that she was
unmarried, and that her premiums were calculated on that basis. There-
fore, State Farm argued that White could not now argue that she was
married, and thus benefit from the misrepresentation. The court found
that a fact issue existed as to any representations by White and State
Farm's agent; therefore, State Farm's motion for summary judgment on
that issue was also denied. 178
The court in Valentine v. Safeco Lloyds Insurance Co.179 rejected an
insured's attempt to collect under her UM/UIM coverage for her employ-
ment-related injuries. Valentine was injured when she fell off the back
bumper of her employer-owned truck while loading it. She alleged that
her injuries resulted from her employer's negligence in failing to properly
repair the bumper. Valentine recovered $30,000 in worker's compensa-
tion benefits, and then sued her employer's automobile carrier, Liberty
Mutual, and her own UM/UIM carrier, Safeco. The trial court granted
summary judgment for both insurers.
Safeco argued that Valentine's employer was not a "negligent, finan-
cially irresponsible motorist."'180 Valentine, however, claimed that she
was entitled to the UM/UIM benefits since she was unable to collect
under her employer's auto policy. 18' Maintaining that the sum she re-
ceived in her worker's compensation settlement was inadequate to cover
her actual damages, Valentine asserted that her employer should be
treated as underinsured. Citing the majority rule in other jurisdictions,
the court declined to label the employer underinsured.182 The court
noted that under workers compensation law,183 Valentine was not "le-
175. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §1.91(b) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
176. White, 907 F. Supp. at 1019.
177. "The quasi estoppel doctrine prevents a party from asserting a position to the dis-
advantage of another and then asserting a right which is inconsistent with the previous
position." Id. at 1019 (citing Stimpson v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied)).
178. Id. at 1019.
179. 928 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
180. Id. at 642, n.3 (citing Francis v. International Serv. Ins. Co., 546 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex.
1976) (stating that the legislature's intent in requiring UIM coverage was "to protect con-
scientious motorists from financial loss caused by negligent, financially irresponsible
motorists")).
181. Valentine's sole remedy against the negligence of her employer was workers' com-
pensation benefits.
182. Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
183. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. art 408.001 (Vernon 1996).
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gaily entitled to recover" from her employer. 184 The court noted that the
Insurance Code also requires the insured to be "legally entitled to re-
cover damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicles.' 85 Declaring that this requirement manifests the legisla-
ture's intent that the insured be legally entitled to sue the tortfeasor for
damages as a prerequisite to UM/UIM coverage, the court held that Val-
entine's claims did not fall within the scope of the UM/UIM coverage
provided by Safeco's policy as a matter of law. 186
D. NAMED DRIVER EXCLUSION
In Zamora v. Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co.,187 Vela was
named as an excluded driver on her husband's automobile policy. While
driving her husband's car, Vela was involved in an automobile accident
with the Zamoras. The Zamoras sued Vela and her husband for negli-
gence, gross negligence and negligent entrustment. Dairyland denied
coverage based on the named driver exclusion. Later, Vela, her husband
and the Zamoras filed suit against Dairyland alleging that the carrier
wrongfully failed to provide coverage and a defense. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Dairyland.
On appeal, the court upheld the summary judgment. The court noted
that, unlike the family member exclusion, the named driver exclusion
does not violate public policy because it "does not create the same inequi-
table effects on a potential class of claimants ... ."188 The named driver
exclusion, reasoned the court, "furthers public policy by enabling drivers
with family members having poor driving records to secure" affordable
insurance, rather than being relegated to the assigned risk pool. 189 The
court also theorized that the named driver exclusion "deters insured driv-
ers from entrusting their automobiles to unsafe excluded drivers, thus,
keeping those unfit drivers off public roadways."' 190 The court held that
the allegations of negligent entrustment against Vela's husband did not
overcome the language of the family member exclusion because the pur-
pose of the exclusion was "to suspend coverage when a specific person,
considered or known to be an unsafe driver, is operating a covered vehi-
cle."'191 Therefore, Dairyland was under no duty to defend Vela's hus-
band for the negligent entrustment allegations.
184. Valentine, 928 S.W.2d at 644.
185. Id.; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (1) (Vernon 1981).
186. Valentine, 928 S.W.2d at 644.
187. 930 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ requested).
188. Id. at 740.
189. Id. at 741 (citing Wright v. Rodney D. Young Ins. Agency, 905 S.W.2d 293, 296
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ); Greene v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 739, 740
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
190. Id. (citing Wright, 905 S.W.2d at 296; DiFrancesco v. Houston General Ins. Co.,
858 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ)). This is a plausible theory, but
in the real world it probably doesn't work that way.
191. Id. at 742 (citing DiFrancesco, 858 S.W.2d at 599).
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E. FAMILY MEMBER EXCLUSION
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nguyen, 192 the court
explored the parameters of the "resident of [the insured's] household"
requirement within the definition of "family member" found in the Texas
personal automobile policy. In 1992, Mrs. Nguyen, who was pregnant,
was involved in an automobile accident. As a result of the collision, she
sustained injuries which required an emergency caesarean section. Her
daughter survived for six days, then died from accident related injuries.
It was undisputed that the child spent her entire life in the hospital and
never went to the Nguyens' home. Dr. Nguyen subsequently sued his
wife under the wrongful death statute for the child's death. State Farm
defended Mrs. Nguyen in the lawsuit, which resulted in a $100,000 judg-
ment against her. State Farm then denied indemnity coverage for the
judgment under the "family member" exclusion and filed a declaratory
judgment action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Nguyens on the ground that the "family member" exclusion was
inapplicable.
On appeal, the court initially held that, consistent with the Texas
Supreme Court's opinions in National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
v. Johnson,193 and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanford,194 "the
family member exclusion is invalid only to the extent it conflicts with the
minimum liability limit of the Texas Safety Responsibility Act;"'195 there-
fore, "if the family member exclusion applies, State Farm's liability can-
not exceed $20,000. '' 196 Next, the court of appeals considered whether
the infant qualified as a "resident" of Mrs. Nguyen's household. In re-
viewing cases in Texas and other jurisdictions on this issue, the court
found that the duration of the individual's stay in the household, the rela-
tionship between the individual and the named insured, and the parties'
intent are factors to be considered in the analysis.' 97 Additionally, the
court noted that the term "resident" is an elastic and amorphous term,
but that the age and self-sufficiency of the injured person, along with the
absence of other lodging are significant factors. 198 Concluding that the
infant was not a resident of the hospital, the court held that the child was
a resident of the Nguyens' household for purposes of determining the
applicability of the "family member" exclusion because there was no in-
tent that she would remain at the hospital after recovery. 199 Accordingly,
because the "family member" exclusion was applicable, the court of ap-
192. 920 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
193. 879 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1993).
194. 879 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex. 1994).
195. Formerly TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, § 1(10); Act of May 28,1983, 68th
Leg., R.S., ch. 535, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3122, 3124, repealed by Act of April 21, 1995,
74th Leg. R.S., ch. 165, § 24(a), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1870, 1871 (to be codified in the Texas
Transportation Code).
196. Nguyen, 920 S.W.2d at 410-11.
197. Id. at 412-13.




peals reformed and rendered judgment that Dr. Nguyen could recover
$20,000 against State Farm, the minimum liability limits within the Texas
Safety Responsibility Act.2°°
VI. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In Thomas J. Sibley, P.C. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pitts-
burgh,20 1 the Sibley law firm and some of its attorneys were sued by
Covey Energy for violations of RICO20 2 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade
Practices Act.20 3 The Sibley firm represented Genesis Energy in a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in Louisiana. Covey Energy purchased Gen-
esis' oil and gas lease interests from the bankruptcy trustee. After
determining that the lease interests were essentially worthless, Covey
sued the Sibley firm and others. The Sibley firm presented the claim to
its professional liability carrier, National Union, which denied coverage
on the basis that the RICO and LUTPA claims fell within the exclusion
for dishonest, fraudulent or malicious acts.204
Initially, National Union argued that the policy did not provide cover-
age for the claim against the Sibley firm because Covey Energy was not a
client of the firm. The district court, however, rejected this argument and
held that a lawyer or a firm can be covered even if the underlying suit is
brought by a party other than a client.20 5 The court then determined that
200. Id.
201. 921 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
202. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
203. Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1401 (1996).
204. National Union's professional liability policy issued to the Sibley firm provided:
I. Coverage
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of any claim or claims, including
claim(s) for personal injury, first made against the insured and reported to
the Company during the policy period or extended reporting period, arising
out of any act, error or omission of the insured in rendering or failing to
render professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a lawyer,
fiduciary or Notary Public, and caused by the insured or any other person for
whose acts, errors or omissions the insured is legally responsible, except as
excluded or limited by the terms, conditions and exclusions of this policy.
EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not apply:
(a) to any claim arising out of any criminal act, error or omission of any
insured;
(b) to any claim arising out of any dishonest, fraudulent or malicious act,
error or omission of any insured, committed with actual dishonest, fraud-
ulent, or malicious purpose or intent.
Sibley, 921 F. Supp. at 1529-30.
205. Id. at 1530 (citing Sachs v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 303 F.Supp. 1339, 1340-
41 (D.D.C. 1969) ("coverage for suit against lawyer brought by another lawyer claiming
wrongful interference with the latter's agreement with his client"); Continental Casualty
Co. v. Reinhardt, 247 F. Supp. 173, 174 (D. Or. 1965) ("coverage for trade libel suit against
law firm brought by a principal of an insolvent debtor who had been the target of a judg-




because a finding of actual intent was required for the RICO violations,
National Union was not obligated to indemnify the Sibley firm for any
liability it might incur as a result of those allegations. 20 6 With regard to
the LUTPA allegations, however, the court concluded that the law was
ambiguous on whether a plaintiff must prove intent to have a viable
LUTPA violation. Therefore, the court found that National Union was
obligated to defend the Sibley firm on all claims arising from the Covey
litigation.20 7 In Matthews v. Home Insurance Co.,208 Matthews repre-
sented Durango Associates and won a judgment for $11.6 million. After
the judgment was set aside, Durango sued Matthews, alleging that his acts
caused the judgment to be set aside. In April 1991, Matthews was served
with the Durango suit. Home was Matthews' professional liability carrier
through a policy effective May 4, 1990, to May 4, 1991, and renewed the
policy for the next two years. The policy excluded coverage for acts of
malpractice occurring before May 4, 1990. The Durango suit alleged
Matthews committed malpractice in 1989, and possibly earlier. Home de-
nied coverage because the claim arose before May 4, 1990, and because
Matthews did not notify Home of the claim until October 1991, more
than six months after the original policy ended.
The policy required three events in order to trigger coverage: "(1) the
act causing the claim must have occurred on or after May 4, 1990; (2) a
claim must be made against the insured during the policy period; and (3)
the insured must notify Home of the claim during the policy period. ' '20 9
There was no dispute that only the second event occurred. Matthews
sued Home for breach of contract, bad faith, and Insurance Code and
DTPA violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Home
on all claims.
Alleging that he only received the declarations page to the policy, Mat-
thews contended that the prior acts endorsement was not part of his pol-
icy (even though he signed it shortly before the policy was issued), and
that the policy jacket's limitations on coverage and reporting periods con-
flicted with the declarations page's "claims made" language. Citing Texas
rules of policy construction, the court held that the more specific provi-
sions of the policy control over the general language in the declarations
page.210 The court also found that even if Home did not provide all of
the documents listed on the declarations page to Matthews, Matthews
knew that the insurance contract was incomplete on its face. As a result,
the court held that "there was no fact issue concerning what the contract
of the parties was." 211 Finally, the court rejected Matthews' contention
that the declarations page constituted a misrepresentation under the In-
surance Code and the DTPA, citing Texas law holding "that an endorse-
206. Id. at 1530-31.
207. Id. at 1532.
208. 916 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
209. Id. at 667.




ment to a policy prevails over inconsistent printed provisions of the
policy."212
VII. HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE
A. HEALTH INSURANCE
In Columbia Universal Life Insurance Co. v. Miles,213 Miles met with
his insurance agent to change his health insurance coverage. The agent
filled out the application by asking Miles the questions listed on the form
and filling in the answers. Miles testified that he provided the agent with
a complete medical history. The agent testified that Miles related only
the conditions that appeared on the form. In actuality, Miles had an ex-
tensive medical history which was not listed on the form, including im-
mune deficiency, and other chronic illnesses. Miles claimed that he
signed the application without reading it. Shortly after filling out the
form, Columbia called Miles to conduct a personal history interview and
to confirm the information on the application. During the interview,
Miles represented to Columbia that the medical information in the appli-
cation was complete and accurate. At this time, he did not mention any-
thing about his chronic conditions. Subsequently, Columbia issued the
policy to Miles.
Later, Miles was treated for an illness related to his immune deficiency
condition. He filed a claim with Columbia. Columbia requested a state-
ment from Miles, but he delayed forwarding the statement until the third
request from Columbia. Columbia then requested medical records from
Miles' doctors relating to Miles' condition. Upon receiving these records,
Columbia learned for the first time that Miles suffered from immune defi-
ciency and related chronic illnesses. Columbia requested advice from its
underwriting department and attorneys. Columbia concluded that Miles
had intentionally concealed his conditions to induce Columbia to provide
coverage. Columbia's attorney wrote Miles and offered him an opportu-
nity to agree to rescind the policy in return for immediate refund of his
premiums and a release of all claims Miles might have against Columbia.
Miles refused this offer. Then, instead of canceling the policy, Columbia
filed a declaratory judgment action to determine its rights under the pol-
icy and to accomplish a rescission. Miles filed claims of breach of con-
tract and bad faith against Columbia. At trial, Miles prevailed.
The court of appeals noted that the cancellation of a policy may consti-
tute bad faith.214 Columbia's cancellation was based on Miles' alleged
misrepresentations. The court noted that before an insurance company
may cancel a policy based on misrepresentation in the application, the
212. Id. at 670.
213. 923 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ requested).
214. Id. at 811 (citing Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex.
1994) ("A cause of action is stated by alleging that the insurer had no reasonable basis for




carrier must show an intent to deceive on the part of the insured. 215 Spe-
cifically, the insurer must prove: "(1) the making of a representation; (2)
the falsity of that representation; (3) reliance by the insurer on that repre-
sentation; (4) the insured's intent to deceive the insurer with the misrep-
resentation; and (5) the materiality of the representation. '216 The failure
of the insurance company to show intent to deceive makes any cancella-
tion within two years of the policy issuance a breach of contract as a mat-
ter of law.217 The court found that in Miles' case Columbia went the
extra mile, offering Miles an opportunity to agree to the proposed rescis-
sion and refund. Once Miles refused, Columbia brought a declaratory
judgment action to determine the parties' rights. The court held that Co-
lumbia had ample evidence to satisfy all of the elements of the misrepre-
sentation defense. The court reversed the judgment in favor of Miles and
rendered that he take nothing.218
B. LIFE INSURANCE
In Bates v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.,219 Jackson National
issued a policy insuring the life of Bates. On his application for the Jack-
son National policy, Bates represented that within the past five years he
had not consulted, been examined, or treated by a physician, and that he
had not submitted to any laboratory test or study. He also represented
that within the past ten years he had not been diagnosed with any disease
or abnormality of the heart, blood, or blood vessels, or with diabetes.
Notwithstanding these representations, Bates had been examined by a
physician within a month prior to submitting his application, and he had
been diagnosed with a mild case of diabetes. Approximately one year
after the policy was issued, Bates died of a gunshot wound. Jackson Na-
tional denied the claim by Bates' beneficiaries for the policy proceeds
based on his misrepresentations on the policy application. The benefi-
ciaries brought suit for breach of contract, bad faith, and violations of
article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.
The court first analyzed the beneficiaries' contractual claim by noting
that there are five elements an insurer must plead and prove under Texas
law to establish a misrepresentation defense: "(1) the making of a repre-
sentation; (2) the falsity of the representation; (3) reliance on the misrep-
resentation by the insurer; (4) intent to deceive on the part of the insured
in making the misrepresentation; and (5) the materiality of the misrepre-
sentation. ' 220 The beneficiaries conceded that Bates made misrepresen-
tations on his application and that Jackson National relied on them.
However, they denied that Bates acted intentionally with the purpose of
deceiving Jackson National, and that the misrepresentations were mate-
215. Id. (citing Shelton, 889 S.W.2d at 281-82).
216. Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 811.
218. Id. at 814,
219. 927 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
220. Id. at 1018 (citations omitted).
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rial. In opposition to Jackson National's motion for summary judgment,
the beneficiaries submitted evidence that Bates was generally a truthful
man, and that the agent, who helped him complete the application, in-
duced Bates' false answers because she worked on commission and
needed the sale. They also submitted an affidavit from an underwriting
agent from another company stating that it is not unusual for a sales
agent to induce a proposed insured to give incorrect answers on policy
applications. The underwriting agent's affidavit also opined that Jackson
National would have issued Bates a policy even had it known of his true
condition, albeit with slightly different coverage and for a higher
premium.
The court concluded that misrepresentations in an application for a
policy, even where the insured has knowledge of his health condition,
cannot alone establish an intent to deceive by the insured as a matter of
law.221 Accordingly, the court concluded that the evidence submitted by
Jackson National of the timing of Bates' visits to his physician, even when
coupled with evidence that he had made similar misrepresentations on
applications for disability insurance with other carriers within two months
after being diagnosed with diabetes, did not prove his intent to deceive as
a matter of law.22 2 Accordingly, Jackson National's motion for summary
judgment on the beneficiaries' contract claim was denied.
Next, in analyzing the beneficiaries' bad faith claim, the court noted
that, unlike employees covered by workers' compensation, the benefi-
ciaries were not parties to the insurance contract between Jackson Na-
tional and Bates and did not provide any consideration for the benefits
payable upon Bates' death. Further, unlike employees who give up their
common law remedies in exchange for workers' compensation benefits,
the beneficiaries gave up nothing to obtain their status as beneficiaries of
the Jackson National policy. This evidence, according to the court, sug-
gested that the beneficiaries were third-parties claimants under the policy
who did not have standing to sue Jackson National for bad faith.22 3 Even
assuming that the beneficiaries had standing to bring a bad faith claim,
the court noted that the undisputed evidence that Bates made misrepre-
sentations concerning his health on his application for insurance fur-
nished, as a matter of law, a reasonable basis for Jackson National to
question the claim and to deny payment to the beneficiaries.2 24 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that Jackson National was entitled to summary
judgment on the beneficiaries' bad faith claim.2 2 5
Finally, the court questioned whether the beneficiaries were entitled to
assert a claim under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code,226 noting that
they did not fall into any clearly recognized category of persons entitled
221. Id. at 1020.
222. Id. at 1021.
223. Id. at 1023.
224. Id. at 1024.
225. Id.
226. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996).
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to standing to assert Insurance Code violations. Nonetheless, relying on a
Texas appellate court decision 227 holding that named beneficiaries of a
life insurance policy have standing to assert violations of the Texas Insur-
ance Code, the court held that the beneficiaries had standing to assert the
claim. The court went on, however, to state that the Insurance Code is
"essentially a statutory codification of already existing common law re-
quirements" concerning the "reasonableness" of denying a claim.228 In
other words, in order to establish a statutory violation under the Insur-
ance Code, the same elements necessary to establish a claim for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing must be proven.229 Thus, the court
concluded that, due to Bates' misrepresentations of his condition on the
application, Jackson National had a reasonable basis for denying the
claim and was entitled to summary judgment on the beneficiaries' article
21.21 claims.230
In Pankow v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.,231 the Pankows obtained
credit life insurance from Colonial at the same time they acquired a mort-
gage loan from Colonial Savings. After the Pankows defaulted on both
obligations, they paid to reinstate both the loan and the insurance after a
representative of Colonial Savings, Guiberteau, told them that he had the
authority to reinstate both. Due to an apparent lack of communication
between the two Colonial entities, a representative of Colonial Life in-
formed the Pankows in a letter that the credit life policy had lapsed and
referenced a refund check for six premiums which had previously been
sent to them. Mrs. Pankow had already cashed the refund check, and
later claimed that she did not know why it was sent. The letter from
Colonial Life, however, informed the Pankows that the policy could be
reinstated for $360. After Mrs. Pankow called to say that she did not
have the money, the Colonial Life representative informed her that there
was a sufficient amount of money in an escrow account to pay for the
policy. Mrs. Pankow requested that the funds be transferred, but appar-
ently action was never taken by Colonial Life. Later, Mrs. Pankow called
again to ask if the funds had been transferred, and represented that her
husband was in good health. Colonial Life reinstated the policy, but later
refused to satisfy the Pankow mortgage when it discovered that Mr.
Pankow had actually died a day before Mrs. Pankow's last call.
On appeal, Pankow argued that, even though she and her husband had
not presented Guiberteau with the requisite proof of insurability when he
offered to reinstate the policy, Guiberteau had the actual or apparent au-
thority to reinstate the insurance by other means. The court concluded
227. Mendoza v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d 605, 611-12 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, no writ).
228. Bates, 927 F. Supp. at 1026 (citing Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 13 F.3d




231. 932 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
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that the policy itself negated Guiberteau's actual authority to modify the
policy.232 The court also denied Pankow's claim for misrepresentation,
by noting that "to the extent that Guiberteau may have told them that he
could personally reinstate the policy through means other than those ex-
pressed in the policy, [the Pankows] knew, as a matter of law, that he
could not.' '233 The court also found that before the Pankows delivered
proof of insurability to Colonial Life, Mrs. Pankow received and cashed
the premium refund check. Because Mr. Pankow died before the out-
standing payments were made, the court held that the offer to reinstate
was not accepted in the manner required by the policy.234 The court did
find, however, that agents of Colonial Life may have made misrepresen-
tations to the Pankows when they told the Pankows that the policy could
be reinstated through a transfer of funds from the escrow account, but
failed to follow through on the transfer. The court ordered that the alle-
gations of fraud and deceptive trade practices arising from the misrepre-
sentation that the monies would be transferred from the escrow account
to pay the outstanding premiums be remanded to the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings. 235
VIII. TITLE INSURANCE
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed the failure of title to a
ranch in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Becker.236 The Beckers sued Stew-
art Title and other defendants after discovering that the sellers did not
have clear title to at least part of the ranch which the Beckers purchased.
The Beckers argued that Insurance Code article 9.34237 gave rise to a
private cause of action238 through article 21.21.239 The court determined
that Stewart Title's conduct in writing a title policy, without determining
the insurability of title in accordance with sound title underwriting prac-
tices, was not a basis for a private cause of action under article 9.34 and
did not constitute a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice as de-
232. Id. at 275.
233. Id. at 277.
234. Id. at 276.
235. Id. at 279.
236. 930 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
237. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.34 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
238. Article 9.34 regulates the conditions which title insurers must meet before issuing a
title policy. One of the conditions prohibits the writing of a title insurance policy unless
"(3) there has been made a determination of insurability of title in accordance with sound
title underwriting practices .... TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 9.34 (3) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
239. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon 1981). Section 16(a) provides:
Any person who has been injured by another's engaging in any of the prac-
tices declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or regulations lawfully
adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair methods of competition
and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance or in
any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Commerce Code, as
amended, as an unlawful deceptive trade practice may maintain an action
against the company or companies engaging in such acts or practices.
1356 [Vol. 50
INSURANCE LAW
fined by DTPA section 17.46.240
IX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. RESCISSION OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Saenz sued her employer's workers' compensation carrier and its ad-
juster for wrongfully inducing her to settle her claim in Saenz v. Fidelity
& Guaranty Insurance Underwriters.241 While on the job, Saenz fell over
a chair, and hit her head on the floor. She was hospitalized for several
days. After being released, Saenz saw numerous physicians for chronic
headaches, drowsiness, seizures and other ailments. She was diagnosed
as having post-concussion syndrome which could require indefinite medi-
cal treatment. Fidelity & Guaranty, the workers' compensation carrier,
promptly began paying her weekly wage benefits, as well as medical bills.
During the next year, Fidelity's adjuster, Gisela Armstrong, had many
conversations with Saenz to settle her claim. Saenz repeatedly told Arm-
strong that her primary concern was that her medical expenses be paid
for the rest of her life, a benefit which the workers compensation act pro-
vides. Armstrong, however, never told Saenz that she might be entitled
to lifetime medical coverage for the injury. Saenz contended that Arm-
strong told her that workers' compensation would cover medical ex-
penses for only five years. Saenz did not have an attorney because she
did not want to pay any attorney's fees out of her potential settlement.
Saenz claimed that Armstrong told her that having an attorney would not
affect the size of the settlement.
Fidelity's attorney wrote Armstrong stating that Saenz's claim was po-
tentially dangerous. Eventually, the attorney was able to effect a settle-
ment with Saenz for $65,000 and five years of medical treatment. After
the settlement, Saenz called Fidelity's office and asked for copies of her
medical records. The records Fidelity sent included two letters from Fi-
delity's attorneys that indicated that Saenz's claim was very serious, and
that settling with a limitation of five years of medical treatment was im-
portant for Fidelity to avoid the possibility that Saenz's condition would
deteriorate to the point where Fidelity would be required to pay statutory
lifetime compensation benefits in addition to lifetime medical benefits.
Saenz contended in court that from these letters in her medical file, she
learned for the first time that she had been entitled to lifetime medical
treatment. Saenz sued Fidelity and Armstrong under various theories,
but did not pursue a claim for rescission of the settlement. At trial, the
jury awarded exemplary damages in addition to substantial damages for
past and future mental anguish and future medical costs.
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the court determined that
240. Stewart, 930 S.W.2d at 753-54; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
241. 925 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1996).
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Saenz's sole remedy for loss of medical benefits was rescission. 242 The
court held that "[a] person who is fraudulently induced to settle a work-
ers compensation claim cannot recover as damages in a lawsuit the value
of the benefits she would have been entitled to but for the settlement. ,243
The Workers' Compensation Act vests the power to award benefits solely
in the Workers' Compensation Commission.244 The court concluded that
the Commission's jurisdiction would be circumvented if courts were al-
lowed to award damages for wrongful deprivation of benefits. 245 There-
fore, the claimant's sole remedy was rescission of the settlement
agreement and reassertion of the compensation claim. 246 The court also
found that Saenz had presented inadequate evidence to support an award
for mental anguish damages. 247 Because Saenz was not entitled to an
award of actual damages, the court also reversed her punitive damages
award.248
B. ABANDONMENT OF SPOUSE
Williams v. Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance249 involved an al-
leged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by an insurer in the
handling of a workers' compensation claim. The court considered
whether to affirm a summary judgment granted to U.S. Fire on bad faith
claims asserted by Essie Williams. The workers' compensation claim was
based on the death of Nathaniel Williams. At the time of Nathaniel's
death, his employer had a workers' compensation policy with U.S. Fire.
Following Nathaniel's death, U.S. Fire received a first report of the injury
from the employer which identified Nathaniel's spouse as Lessie Voyd,
Nathaniel's current girlfriend. The insurer later learned that another wo-
man, Essie Williams, contacted the employer claiming to be Nathaniel's
spouse and therefore entitled to the benefits. U.S. Fire conducted an in-
vestigation and concluded that Essie Williams was not entitled to bene-
fits, but that Lessie was.
Essie Williams filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' Compensa-
tion Commission. After a Benefit Review Conference and a Contested
Case Hearing were held, the Contested Case Hearing Officer agreed with
U.S. Fire that Williams was not entitled to the benefits under the policy.
Williams appealed the officer's decision to the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Panel. The Appeals Panel reversed the officer, concluding Wil-
liams was entitled to benefits.
242. Id. at 612.
243. Id.
244. See id.; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 408.001, 410.168, 410.203-.205, 410.208 (Vernon
1996).
245. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 612.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 614.
248. Id.
249. 915 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ requested).
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Williams filed suit against U.S. Fire, alleging various causes of action
for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violations of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) and the Insurance Code.
U.S. Fire obtained a summary judgment at the trial court level. However,
the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that there were fact issues as to
whether U.S. Fire conducted a reasonable investigation prior to denying
Williams' claim and that fact issues existed as to whether they had a rea-
sonable basis to deny her claim. The court held, consistent with Viles v.
Security National Insurance Co.,250 that in determining whether an in-
surer had a reasonable basis for denying a claim, the court reviews the
facts before the insurer at the time the claim was denied.
U.S. Fire conceded that, in making its decision to deny Williams' claim,
it relied exclusively on its reading of Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion Rule 132.3.251 U.S. Fire contended that because Williams had not
lived with Nathaniel for over a year immediately prior to his death, she
was deemed to have abandoned him under the rule and was thus not
entitled to benefits as a surviving spouse. Williams, however, contended
that Rule 132.3 did not preclude her recovery because under the rule,
surviving spouses are ineligible for benefits only if all three of the follow-
ing requirements are met: (1) the surviving spouse abandoned the em-
ployee, (2) without good cause, and (3) for more than one year
immediately preceding the employee's death. Williams contended that
U.S. Fire failed to consider if all three conditions were met, and there-
fore, failed to conduct a sufficient investigation to justify denying her
claim.
The court agreed with Williams that there was little, if any, information
on whether good cause existed for her deemed abandonment of Nathan-
iel. According to the court, the U.S. Fire adjuster never attempted to
determine the reasons for the separation of Nathaniel and Williams or
whether there was any good cause for the abandonment. As a result, the
court held that U.S. Fire did not have sufficient evidence before it to de-
termine whether Rule 132.3 justified denying Williams' claim, as U.S. Fire
had no evidence before it indicating whether good cause existed for the
abandonment. The court then held that there were fact issues as to
whether U.S. Fire conducted a reasonable investigation before denying
Williams' claim and whether it had a reasonable basis for denying Wil-
250. 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990).
251. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 132.3 (West 1996). Workers' Compensation Commission
Rule 132.3(b) stated in pertinent part:
A surviving spouse who abandoned the employee, without good cause for
more than one year immediately preceding the death, shall be ineligible to
receive death benefits. The surviving spouse shall be deemed to have aban-
doned the employee if the surviving spouse and the employee had not been
living in the same household for more than one year preceding the em-
ployee's death unless the spouse is: (1) hospitalized; (2) in a nursing home;
or (3) living apart due to career choices, military duty, or other reasons





liams' claim.2 52 As a result, the summary judgment in favor of U.S. Fire
was reversed.
C. REMOVAL
The case of Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc.253 addressed the issue of removal
to federal court of an employee's claims against his workers' compensa-
tion carrier for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in con-
nection with the carrier's handling of the employee's workers'
compensation claim. Patin sustained a work-related injury while em-
ployed by Allied Signal. Travelers Indemnity Company, Allied's work-
ers' compensation insurance carrier, paid medical bills for Patin's
treatment, but never paid weekly workers' compensation benefits be-
cause Patin had lost no time from work as a result of his injury and be-
cause he had a pre-existing physical limitation in his shoulder. Patin filed
a workers' compensation claim with the Texas Industrial Accidents
Board, which awarded him $42,000. Both parties to that administrative
proceeding appealed to state district court. Following trial, the jury
awarded Patin $75,000 for permanent partial disability, but rejected his
claim for total temporary disability.
Patin and his wife later filed suit, which included a claim against Travel-
ers for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Travelers re-
moved the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. The Patins timely filed a motion to remand the case to state
court contending that as an insurance company conducting business in
Texas, Travelers was a de facto citizen of Texas and that removal was not
proper. They also alleged that no proof existed that the required $50,000
minimum jurisdictional amount was met. The district court denied the
Patins' motion to remand.
Travelers filed a motion for summary judgment that was granted.
Then, the Patins timely filed a notice of appeal, insisting that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1445(c), which precludes the removal of claims arising under state
workers' compensation laws, mandated remand to state court because the
claims against Travelers arose under the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act.
The court began its analysis by reiterating the rule that the "arising
under" standard expressed in § 1445(c) should be interpreted broadly
and in a manner consistent with the court's interpretation of that stan-
dard under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which governs federal question jurisdic-
tion.254 The court held that, as the Texas Supreme Court in Aranda v.
Insurance Co. of North America255 made clear, good faith and fair dealing
claims arise under common law, not under the workers' compensation
252. Williams, 915 S.W.2d at 44.
253. 69 F.3d 1 (5th Cir. 1995), affd, 77 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1996).
254. Id. at 5.
255. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
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statute.256 Section 1445(c) was passed to encourage the use of adminis-
trative procedures and to prevent the undue burden placed on a worker
when an action is removed to federal court, where such procedures gen-
erally do not apply.257 However, the court concluded that the policy does
not apply when the cause of action at issue is independent of the adminis-
trative procedures applicable to a state workers' compensation claim, as
is a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.258 The
court concluded that claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing do not arise under the state workers' compensation statutes, but
are, at most, "related to" those statutes and thus do not come within the
ambit of the non-removability provision of § 1445(c). 259 As a result, the
court concluded that § 1445(c) does not preclude the removal of a
worker's bad faith claims against the employer's workers' compensation
carrier.260
X. AGENCY
A. DUTIES OF AGENT TO INSURER
In Southland Lloyd's Insurance Co. v. Tomberlain,261 Charles
Tomberlain owned Tomberlain Insurance Agency. His son, Chuck, was
an agent with the agency. Chuck also owned and managed numerous real
properties in the area. Chuck purchased a house at an auction, and sub-
sequently signed a contract for sale with Trennis Willis for $20,000 to be
paid over twenty years. In his capacity as an agent, Chuck issued a policy
on the house. Three years later, when the policy expired, he applied for
insurance with Southland, which approved the application and coverage
on the house for $20,000. After Chuck learned that Willis had vacated
the house, he began preparing the house for a new tenant. Shortly before
the new tenant was to move into the house, a fire caused $20,000 worth of
damage to the house. The fire department's report concluded that the
fire was of suspicious origin as it had started with the aid of accelerants.
Chuck submitted a claim with Southland on the day of the fire. Over the
next two months, Chuck periodically contacted Southland to check on the
status of his claim and was told that an investigation was being conducted.
Finally, Southland sent a letter to Chuck stating that the fire was the re-
sult of arson and required further investigation. Two weeks later, South-
land advised Tomberlain that Southland was immediately canceling its
agency agreement with the agency and would seek damages as a result of
misrepresentations on the application submitted by Chuck. On that same
day, Southland sent Chuck a letter stating that it was investigating the
256. Patin, 69 F.3d at 5-6.




261. 919 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
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claim as potential arson and that Southland believed it had been "duped"
by misrepresentations in Chuck's application.
Chuck sued Southland for statutory claims handling violations, bad
faith and negligence. Southland counterclaimed against Chuck for
breach of fiduciary duties as an agent, breach of contractual responsibili-
ties and negligence in preparing the application. In the middle of the
case, Southland paid Chuck $20,900 to settle his claim and then sued the
agency for indemnification. The trial court granted a directed verdict for
Chuck on his claims against Southland for failing to promptly pay claims
and granted a directed verdict for Chuck and the agency as to all counter-
claims and third-party claims raised by Southland. The jury found know-
ing and intentional violations on the bad faith and statutory unfair
insurance practices claims.
On appeal, Southland argued that an individual has no private cause of
action under article 21.21262 pursuant to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wat-
son.263 The court, however, explained that Watson only precluded third-
party claimants.264 Because Chuck was an insured under the policy, the
court concluded that he had a cause of action under article 21.21.265 The
court also held that Chuck was a fiduciary of Southland as a result of the
agency relationship. 266 The court noted that the fiduciary duty becomes
especially pronounced when an agent undertakes to write insurance for
himself.267 The court determined that on the application, Chuck misrep-
resented the age of the house, the purchase price, and owner occupancy
status, and failed to report serious structural deficiencies that an agent
would normally report.268 Accordingly, the court held that sufficient evi-
dence existed to preclude a directed verdict against Chuck and the
agency. 269
B. REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUMS
Garrison Contractors, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,270 con-
cerned retrospective premiums due under a multi-line insurance policy.
Garrison purchased a three-year, multi-line insurance policy from Liberty
Mutual. Garrison paid Liberty standard premiums in the aggregate
amount of $865,000 and retrospective premiums over the three year pol-
icy period. At the end of the policy period, Liberty demanded an addi-
tional $157,371.85 in retrospective premiums, which Garrison refused to
pay. Liberty filed suit on a sworn account to collect the retrospective
262. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996).
263. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994).
264. Tomberlain, 919 S.W.2d at 830.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 831 (citing American Indem. Co. v. Baumgart, 840 S.W.2d 634, 639 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ)).
267. Id. (citations omitted).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 927 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
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premiums, and Garrison counterclaimed against Liberty and its agent/
employee, Robert Garrett, who sold Garrison the policy. Garrison al-
leged that Liberty misrepresented the terms of the retrospective premi-
ums, breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breached fiduciary
duties, violated the Texas DTPA, violated article 21.21 of the Insurance
Code, engaged in fraud and duress, and was estopped from collecting the
alleged retrospective premiums. Summary judgment was awarded in
favor of Liberty and Garrett, and Garrison was ordered to pay the
$159,371.85 retrospective premium.
The court of appeals found that Liberty's alleged misrepresentation
that the retrospective premiums would not exceed ten to fifteen percent
of the standard premiums could constitute an actionable misrepresenta-
tion under both the DTPA and the Insurance Code. 271 The court also
found that under section 16 of article 21.21, Garrison had a private cause
of action against Liberty's employee/agent, Garrett. Specifically, the
court held that under section 16, any person who has suffered actual dam-
ages caused by another's engaging in deceptive acts or practices may
maintain a cause of action against the person or persons, including agents,
engaging in the act.272 The court noted, however, that there is no general
fiduciary duty between an insurer and its insured, 273 and that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing does not include the purchase transaction or
the calculation and payment of premiums. 274 The court reversed and re-
manded Garrison's claims of DTPA and Insurance Code violations, but
affirmed Liberty's summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty and
good faith and fair dealing claims. Lastly, the court noted that a fact issue
existed as to whether Liberty's retrospective premiums were agreed to,
reasonable, usual, or customary. 275
C. DUTY TO ADVISE INSURED
Sledge v. Mullin276 addressed whether an insurance agent is obligated
to advise a customer of her insurance needs. Mullin sold Ruby Sledge an
automobile liability policy for her three cars, including a Chevrolet Nova.
The policy was in effect when Sledge notified Mullin that she had ac-
quired a Chevrolet Citation and was selling the Nova to her son, Dale. In
her deposition testimony, Sledge conceded that she could not afford the
cost of insuring four cars, and that she contacted Mullin and instructed
him to "take the Nova off the insurance policy" and substitute the Cita-
tion for the Nova as one of the insured vehicles. 277 Several days after
Mullin received these instructions from Sledge, Dale was involved in an
271. Id. at 300 (citing Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 885 S.W.2d 96, 98-99 (Tex. 1994)).
272. Id. at 301.
273. Id. (citing Caserotti v. State Farm Ins. Co., 791 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, writ denied)).
274. Id. at 302.
275. Id. at 303.
276. 927 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
277. Id. at 91.
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accident while driving the Nova. In the subsequent suit that Sledge and
Dale brought against Mullin, the trial court granted Mullin's motion for
summary judgment and Sledge and Dale appealed.
Sledge argued on appeal that she believed and expected that the substi-
tution would occur on the anniversary date of the policy, which was sub-
sequent to the accident. This contention was inconsistent with her
deposition testimony in which she swore that in asking Mullin to cancel
the Nova's insurance, she did so with the intent that it would be canceled
on the date of the request, not on a later date. Additionally, there was no
evidence that Sledge asked Mullin to insure four cars under the policy or
that she intended that result. The undisputed evidence was that she
asked Mullin to substitute the Citation for the Nova. The Sledges argued
that Mullin was negligent because he breached a duty to Sledge by not
investigating and determining all the details of her disposition of the
Nova at the time she told him to effect the substitution. Sledge also con-
tended that Mullin had a duty to warn her of the potential for her liability
if the Nova was no longer insured by the policy. The gist of her argument
was that, although she could only afford to insure a total of three cars and
told Mullin that she was selling the Nova and wanted him to substitute
the Citation on the policy, he nonetheless had a duty to make certain all
four cars continued to be insured or to inform her that the Nova would
not be covered after the date she requested him to effect the substitution.
Sledge also contended that Mullin should have told her that the policy
provisions extended automatic insurance coverage for any car she might
acquire, such as the Citation, for her first thirty days of ownership, she
claimed that if Mullin had told her about these provisions, she could have
kept all four cars insured and the collision would have been covered.
Although the policy made the thirty-day coverage available automati-
cally, there was no evidence that a fourth car would have been insured
free of charge for thirty days or that Sledge would have had a four-car
coverage for the same price had she paid to insure only three cars. In
fact, the policy provided that if a change required a premium adjustment,
the adjustment would be made as of the effective date of change. 278
There was no evidence that Sledge would have accepted the "automatic"
insurance coverage even if Mullin had told her about it.
The court stated that no legal duty arises on the part of an insurance
agent to expand the insurance protection of his customer. This is true
even if the agent has knowledge of the customer's need for additional
insurance, if there is no evidence showing that the customer and agent
have a special business relationship through a history of dealings in which
they share an expectation that the agent will habitually satisfy all of the
customer's insurance needs without consultation. 279 The court found that
no special business relationship existed between Sledge and Mullin and
278. Id. at 92.
279. Id. at 93 (citing McCall v. Marshall, 398 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. 1965); Pickens v.
Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ)).
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concluded that Mullin complied with Sledge's specific instructions in ef-
fecting the substitution of the Citation for the Nova.280 The court also
concluded that Mullin owed no duty to make certain the Nova was in-
sured after Sledge requested that he substitute one car for another, and
that he owed no duty to tell her how she might keep all four cars insured
for a while longer.281 Thus, Mullin was not negligent in having the Nova
and its drivers deleted from the policy coverage. 282 The court also re-
jected Sledge's claim that, as an insurance agent, Mullin had a duty to see
that the Sledges complied with the Texas Safety Responsibility Act,283
concluding that the language of the act imposes no such duty on insur-
ance agents.284
Finally, the court rejected a claim that Mullin was liable under the
DTPA and Insurance Code. The Sledges conceded that Mullin made no
false statements or affirmative misrepresentations, but argued that his
failure to take steps to protect her interests by keeping the Nova and its
drivers insured, or to advise her about the automatic thirty-day coverage
provision of the policy, was an omission of material fact that amounted to
a passive misrepresentation. The court held that, as a matter of law, Mul-
lin did not violate the Insurance Code or comnmit a misrepresentation or
deceptive trade practice by following Sledge's instructions in substituting
the Citation for the Nova on the policy.285 This is consistent with the
court's holding that Mullin owed Sledge no duty to suggest alternatives
for insuring the Nova when she explained that she was selling it.2 86 The
court stated that in the absence of specific misrepresentation, a policy-
holder's mistaken belief about the scope or availability of coverage is
generally not actionable.287 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary
judgment in favor of Mullin.
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS LETTERS
In American Eagle Insurance Co. v. Nettleton,288 Nettleton's husband
was killed in a crash while test flying a plane he was considering purchas-
ing. Nettleton sued the pilot, the flight museum which owned the plane,
and the airport from which the plane departed. The defendants were in-
sured under a general liability airport policy written by American Eagle
for "bodily injury ... arising out of the sale of aviation fuel and oil. ''289
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing May v. United Servs. Ass'n, 844 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. 1992)).
283. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1997).
284. Sledge, 927 S.W.2d at 93.
285. Id. at 94.
286. Id. (citing Lochabay v. Southwestern Bell Media, 828 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, no writ)).
287. Id. (citing State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moran, 809 S.W.2d 613, 620 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied)).
288. 932 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, writ denied).
289. Id. at 170.
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The policy, however, excluded coverage for aircraft "owned or operated
by or rented or loaned to any insured" or "operated by any person in the
course of his employment by any insured. '290 Although American Eagle
initially refused to defend the Nettleton suit, after Nettleton alleged that
the defendants negligently provided contaminated aviation fuel for the
aircraft, the carrier offered a defense under reservation of rights to the
defendants. The defendants refused the offer and demanded an uncondi-
tional defense. American Eagle then offered to pay for defendants'
choice of counsel, which was also rejected. Two weeks prior to trial, Net-
tleton and the defendants made an assignment and a covenant not to exe-
cute. At trial, the defendants put on no testimony or witnesses and ajudgment was entered for more than $600,000.
In the suit on the policy, Nettleton contended that she was entitled to
summary judgment because: (1) her judgment against American Eagle's
insureds was obtained following an actual trial and was final; (2) Net-
tleton had satisfied her only obligation to receive payment under the pol-
icy; (3) American Eagle waived any policy defenses it had by continuing
investigation and settlement efforts on behalf of its insureds without ob-
taining their agreement that it could do so; (4) American Eagle breached
its policy obligations by refusing to unconditionally defend its insureds
and by not notifying them about settlement offers it was making on their
behalf; and (5) American Eagle's breach of its policy obligations pre-
vented it from collaterally attacking the underlying judgment.291 The El
Paso Court of Appeals, faced with an amended petition which alleged
some covered causes of action and some non-covered causes of action,
held that American Eagle did not breach its duty to defend by refusing to
offer the insureds an unconditional defense. 292 The court noted that had
American Eagle tendered an unconditional defense to the insureds, "all
policy defenses, including noncoverage, would be waived or [American
Eagle] would be estopped from raising them."293 The court also rejected
Nettleton's assertion that American Eagle's continued investigation and
settlement negotiations after the insureds refused a defense under reser-
vation of rights waived all of its policy defenses. 294 The decision also held
290. Id.
291. Id. at 172.
292. Id. at 174.
293. Id. (citing Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520, 521-
22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Williams, 791
S.W.2d 542, 550 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).
294. Id. "[Tihe insurer's participation in conferences looking toward settlement does
not estop the company from denying liability, nor constitute a waiver of a defense ......
16C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTICE § 9365, at 559 (Walter F. Berdal
ed., 1981); see Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aries Marine Corp., 932 F.2d 442,
445 (5th Cir. 1991) ("We have found no authority for the proposition that an insurer's
participation in settlement negotiations, where the insured has retained independent coun-
sel, is tantamount to assuming the assured's defense."); Wilkerson v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 119 F. Supp. 383, 386 (E.D. Va. 1953) (negotiations held not to constitute a waiver of
insurer's rights), affd, 210 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1954); Jacksonville Adjustment Bureau v.
National Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 1 F.2d 800 (S.D. Fla. 1924) (insurer's negotiations for
settlement held not to give rise to estoppel)).
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that American Eagle did not collaterally attack the judgment in the un-
derlying case because under the policy's "no action" clause 295 since the
requirement of an "actual trial" was not satisfied.296
B. ADMINISTRATIVE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the validity of two administrative
rules adopted by the State Board of Insurance in National Ass'n of In-
dependent Insurers v. Texas Department of Insurance.297 Several insur-
ance companies and insurance trade associations challenged the validity
of the rules. The first rule, Rule 1000, prohibits insurance companies
from refusing to sell certain types of insurance to prospective purchasers
because they have had an insurance policy canceled by another carrier, or
because they have been insured by a county mutual or a surplus lines
insurance carrier.298 The second rule, Rule 1003, prohibits insurers from
conditioning the sale of automobile insurance on the purchase of another
policy or denying an application because the applicant owns only one
295. The "no action" clause in the American Eagle policy provided:
No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all of the terms of this
policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
fully determined by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by writ-
ten agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has
secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to
recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this
policy.
Nettleton, 932 S.W.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 176-77 (citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714
(Tex. 1996) ("In no event, however, is a judgment for plaintiff against defendant, rendered
without a fully adversarial trial, binding on defendant's insurer or admissible as evidence of
damages in an action against defendant's insurer by plaintiff as defendant's assignee.")).
297. 925 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1996).
298. Rule 1000 states:
(a) The fact that another insurer canceled, non-renewed, or refused to in-
sure an applicant shall not be a reason, in whole or in part, for an insurer or
agent writing or offering personal automobile, residential property, life, acci-
dent or health insurance to refuse to insure or submit an application or
binder or conditional receipt for that applicant. An insurer may base its deci-
sion whether to insure an applicant on the same factor on which another
insurer made its adverse decision if that insurer would have based its decision
on that factor without knowledge of the previous insurer's actions.
(b) The fact that an applicant was previously insured by a county mutual
or surplus lines insurer shall not be a reason, in whole or in part, for an
insurer or agent writing or offering personal automobile or residential prop-
erty insurance to refuse to insure or submit an application or binder or condi-
tional receipt for that applicant.
(c) The failure to comply with this rule shall constitute unfair competition
and unfair practices under the Insurance Code, Article 21.21, and shall be
subject to the provisions thereof. This rule does not prohibit an insurer or
agent from asking if another insurer canceled, non-renewed or refused to
insure the applicant.
28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1000 (West 1996).
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car.299 The violation of these rules constitutes an unfair trade practice 3°°
and subjects an insurer to sanctions.30 1 The carriers argued that these
rules were not adopted in substantial compliance with the procedural re-
quirements for agency rule-making. The trial court held that the rules
were valid and the court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court reversed the lower courts and held in favor of the
carriers. The court noted that a board order must explain the agency's
reasoning in adopting the rule. 30 2 In this case, the board failed to explain
in its order why consideration of a previous denial, along with other per-
missible factors, is unfair or anti-competitive. 30 3 The board merely con-
cluded that consideration of a previous denial will lead to
"blacklisting. '30 4 The board failed to explain why an insurer's considera-
tion of a previous denial is unfairly discriminatory or what affect these
rules will have on consumers or the insurance market.305 The order made
no effort to explain why tethering automobile coverage to an umbrella or
excess coverage is acceptable, while linking coverage to other types of
policies is unfair.30 6 Because the board failed to meet the procedural re-
quirements, the supreme court held the rules invalid.30 7
C. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
IMC Fertilizer, Inc. v. Angus Chemical Co.,308 examined the effective-
ness of a liability release agreement that names an insured party, but not
the insurer. Angus Chemical owned a nitroparaffin plant in Louisiana
managed by IMC Fertilizer. Following an explosion at the plant, numer-
ous individuals sued Angus Chemical and IMC Fertilizer in Texas for per-
sonal injuries. Angus Chemical cross-claimed against IMC Fertilizer,
299. Rule 1003 states:
An insurer or agent shall not condition the issuance, renewal, price, contin-
uation, or amount of coverage of personal automobile insurance on the
number of vehicles to be insured on the policy or on the purchase from the
insurer or any affiliated insurer of any other policy or policies. This rule does
not preclude the application of a type of discount as provided in a rate man-
ual approved by the Texas Department of Insurance or the conditioning of
the sale of any umbrella or excess policy on the purchase of an underlying
policy.
28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1003 (West 1996).
300. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1000(c).
301. TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21, § 7 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1996). At the time these
rules were promulgated, a violation also subjected an insurer to a private cause of action
for damages. See TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981); see also Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. 1994). This portion of the statute has been repealed.
See Act of June 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 13, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988, 3000
(codified as TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21, § 16(a)).
302. National Ass'n, 925 S.W.2d at 669.
303. Id. at 670.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 671.
307. Id.
308. 925 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), rev'd per curiam, 939
S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1997).
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seeking recovery for property damage as well as reimbursement for third-
party claims Angus Chemical had settled. Angus Chemical and IMC Fer-
tilizer subsequently signed a settlement agreement providing that IMC
Fertilizer would pay Angus Chemical a sum of money over three years.
In exchange, Angus Chemical released IMC Fertilizer from all claims
arising from the explosion, except indemnity or contribution arising from
any third-party claims. The settlement agreement was incorporated into
an agreed judgment in favor of Angus Chemical. Angus Chemical subse-
quently filed suit against IMC Fertilizers and its insurers in Louisiana for
recovery of its costs relating to third-party claims. Four days later, IMC
Fertilizer filed suit against Angus Chemical in Texas under various theo-
ries of recovery, including declaratory judgment on the interpretation of
its settlement agreement. Angus Chemical counterclaimed in the Texas
suit on the same causes of action asserted in its Louisiana suit. Angus
Chemical then moved for partial summary judgment in the Texas suit on
the grounds that the settlement agreement did not release IMC Fertiliz-
ers' insurers from any liability because the release did not specifically
name the carriers. In its cross motion for summary judgment, IMC Fertil-
izers argued that its insurers were released because their liability was de-
rivative of its liability. The trial court entered partial summary judgment
in favor of Angus Chemical, finding that the agreement did not release
IMC Fertilizers' insurers under Texas law. The trial court severed this
claim, and IMC Fertilizer appealed.
Angus Chemical argued to the court of appeals that the release of an
insured party does not release its insurers under Texas law unless they are
specifically named in the release. IMC Fertilizer acknowledged that the
settlement agreement did not mention its insurers, but argued that they
were nonetheless released from liability because IMC Fertilizer was re-
leased and because its insurers' liability was derivative of its liability.30 9
The court of appeals acknowledged the general rule that a tortfeasor can-
not be released from liability unless he is specifically named in the release
document. 310 However, they noted that a party who releases a tortfeasor
retains no cause of action against the tortfeasor's liability insurer.31 1 This
is because an insurance policy is based on contractual liability rather than
primary liability. In other words, an injured party does not have a claim
against an insurer unless the insured has a legal obligation to pay dam-
ages. Accordingly, when the injured party releases an insured from liabil-
ity, it cannot pursue liability from the insurer.312 Thus, the court of
appeals concluded that while it is the better practice to specifically name
liability insurers in releases of their insureds, it is not necessary under
Texas law.313 In a per curiam opinion, however, the Texas Supreme
309. Id. at 359.
310. Id. (citing McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971)).






Court rejected the court of appeals' reasoning, holding that a party must
be specifically named in a release to be released from liability. 314 The
court found that Angus could not sue IMC's carriers in Texas because the
release precluded the prerequisite determination of IMC's liability, not
because IMC's carriers were themselves released. 315 The court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial
court.
31 6
314. 939 S.W.2d at 139.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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